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Abstract 
 
We deploy a measure of occupational mismatch based on the discrepancy between 
the portfolio of skills required by an occupation and the array of abilities possessed 
by the worker for learning those skills. We report distinct gender differences in 
match quality and changes in match quality over the course of careers. We also 
show a substantial portion of the gender wage gap stems from match quality 
differences among the college educated. College-educated females are significantly 
more mismatched than males. Moreover, those individuals with children and in 
more flexible occupations tend to be more mismatched. Again, this is especially 
true of women. Cohort effects are also visible in the data: college-educated males 
of the younger cohort are worse off in terms of match quality compared to the older 
cohort, even as the new generation of women is doing better on average. 
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There is an influential literature that emphasizes the importance of quality of job matches for wage 
growth (Simpson 1990; Light and Ureta 1992; Loprest 1992). Finding the right skill match may 
require trying out different occupations, a process that implies costly search (Burdett 1978; 
Jovanovic 1979). This process may be more onerous and costly for workers who are constrained 
in their search options and flexibility to move. Traditionally, women have been expected to do 
more of the housework and care for dependents. They have moreover historically assumed a 
secondary role in family labor supply allocation decisions. Unlike their male counterparts, 
therefore, women may secure worse matches, leading us to anticipate greater mismatch in the labor 
market for women. In short, mismatch may be expected to explain some of the gender wage gap.  
 Most recent additions to this literature seek formally to model and estimate the quality of 
occupational matches (e.g. Lise and Postel-Vinay 2016) using multidimensional objective skill 
measures and occupational requirements along those dimensions. This approach would seem well 
suited to the study of wage disparities resulting from occupational gender segregation in the labor 
market. However, in studies linking wage deficits to imbalances in occupational match quality, 
women are distinguished by their absence. The present paper seeks to remedy this omission. It 
documents gender differences in occupational match quality, analyzes the role of life events such 
as marriage and fertility in this process, and quantifies the portion of the wage gap that may be 
attributable to disparities in match quality.  
Although our main contribution is the analysis of gender differences in match quality over 
a career, we also bring a cohort dimension to the analysis of match quality for a number of reasons. 
First, female labor market participation has increased significantly over the last several decades. 
Second, the labor market is progressively less segregated by gender as women increasingly 
penetrate once male-dominated occupations. These developments are driven not only by 
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technological advances that now make it possible for women to perform many ‘physical jobs’ 
without the exertion of physical power but also by reason of their increased educational 
attainments. And even though college majors remain highly segregated by gender, there is 
undoubtedly a greater female presence in the technical and professional fields (Addison, Ozturk, 
and Wang 2018). Third, there has occurred a shift in perceived gender roles and in the formation 
and nature of relationships. As a result of these developments we might expect the new generation 
of females to be less constrained in their searches and have better matches. To the best of our 
knowledge, the present paper is the first to provide comparisons across cohorts.  
Background Literature 
In analyzing the relationship between match quality and wages, we focus on occupational match 
quality and follow a literature that emphasizes the importance of returns to occupational tenure 
(Kambourov and Manovskii 2009). We will describe an occupation as a composite of the tasks to 
be performed and the skills and knowledge required to master them, using Occupational 
Information Network (O*NET) data. It has been shown that the O*NET indicators capturing these 
task contents of occupations and their knowledge, skill and ability requirements are highly 
correlated with wage outcomes (Yamaguchi 2012; Gathmann and Schönberg 2010). There is a 
related literature that supplements occupational task content with information on worker 
characteristics obtained from measures of cognitive and non-cognitive ability to establish measures 
of multi-dimensional skills-based mismatch (Guvenen et al. 2018; Lise and Postel-Vinay 2016). 
Our paper follows the methodology of the latter line of research, which reports that multi-
dimensional skills-based mismatch leads to wage losses even if the underlying mismatch-
generating mechanism differs in the two studies. Thus, mismatch in Lise and Postel-Vinay (2016) 
arises from search frictions. The costs of mismatch are found to be considerable, especially for 
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cognitive skills. Depending on the worker’s initial skills, mismatch can lead to 8 to 22 percent less 
output over a career. Mismatch in Guvenen et al., on the other hand, stems from workers having 
imperfect knowledge of their own skills: only by moving from occupation to occupation do they 
update their priors and find better matches. Guvenen et al. find strongly negative wage effects of 
mismatch, especially if it is persistent. They report that the the earnings difference between the 
90th percentile and the 10th percentile of mismatch is 4.4 percent after 5 years of occupational 
tenure, widening to 7.4 percent after 10 years. Cumulative mismatch yields a wage difference of 
8.9 percent. Mismatch mostly slows wage growth rather than having an immediate effect on levels. 
It is also found that the negative effects of mismatch vary by education, being much larger for 
college graduates and in particular for the cumulative mismatch measure.  
In their definition of mismatch, these two papers closely resemble our own treatment. This 
is particularly true of Guvenen et al. as regards the modeling of current and cumulative mismatch 
and the incorporation of learning by doing in the model through occupation tenure mismatch 
interactions. However, both papers only address mismatch among males and fail to consider 
gender as a possible component of mismatch or the return to mismatch. Crucially, then, they do 
not address gender wage disparities from mismatch.  
Even if the new mismatch literature does not explore gender differences, this is not true of 
earlier studies that define mismatch from the perspective of educational gaps; specifically, 
discrepancies between a worker’s highest completed schooling and the years of education required 
for a job. That said, this literature has largely reported an absence of material gender differences 
(see Hartog 2000; Battu 2000). Problems with this commonly described ‘over-education’ literature 
include the subjective bias of self-reporting in the absence of formal education measures, estimates 
that are potentially biased by the failure to consider the endogeneity between the reasons for 
   
 
4 
 
accepting a position and wages, and its use of a simplistic unidimensional definition of skill.  
However, one such study bucking the trend in reporting material gender differences also 
seeks to provide a more thoroughgoing attempt to distinguish between the components of 
mismatch. Mavromas et al. (2013) differentiate between education and skill mismatch using 
Australian longitudinal data. Mismatched workers in this paper consist of those who are over-
educated, over-skilled or both. Wage penalties for each category of mismatch are reported for 
women whereas for males a wage penalty attaches only to those who are over-educated and over-
skilled.1 
In re-inserting gender into the contemporary methodology, our approach also provides an 
important link with Goldin (2014), who attributes most if not all of the gender gap in pay to the 
incentive firms have to disproportionately reward those individuals who work long hours or who 
work particular hours. We argue that that if other (i.e. flexible) jobs are limited to only a few 
occupations, then females will experience greater mismatch when flocking into them. We test 
whether a Goldin-type explanation has any purchase in determining match quality by constructing 
a measure of occupational flexibility which we then link to occupational mismatch. 
More generally, we note that Goldin’s approach is echoed in the growing literature on 
‘family friendly’ firms and jobs (see, for example, Kleven et al. 2015, 2018; Hotz et al. 2017). 
However, although firm family friendliness counteracts the wage penalty attaching to motherhood 
in this literature, observe that this offset is achieved at the price of occupational progression 
because family friendly firms in practice employ a less-skilled workforce, and offer lower wage 
dispersion and reduced scope for career advancement. Accordingly, this literature would not agree 
                                                          
1 A study that intermediates between the over-education literature and the multidimensional skills mismatch literature 
is Johansson and Katz (2007), which uses a job analysis measure of skills mismatch rather than average/modal 
education. Another study by Liu et al. (2016) offering an adjusted-earnings based measure of mismatch is notable for 
its emphasis on persistence in mismatch, a notion that is also exploited in the present study. 
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with the proposition that discrimination in temporal job flexibility suffices to close the gender 
wage gap as Goldin suggests is the case (see also Cardoso et al. 2016). 
Finally, if the effect of motherhood and implicitly the existence of a mommy track is one 
key to our analysis, a corollary is the postponement premium (Miller 2011). That is, we examine 
the effect of delaying childbirth on mismatch and thence upon earnings, in effect offering a human 
capital explanation for the timing effect. However, we do not here directly examine the proposition 
that the choice of timing of childbearing is also a function of expected future earnings. Both factors 
and not just the former are likely to be important.  
Data and Measurement Issues 
Data Sources and Sample Construction  
Our main data sets consist of the 1979 and 1997 cohorts of the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth, namely the NLSY79 and the NLSY97. The former provides a nationally representative 
panel of data for the cohort of individuals aged 14 to 22 years in 1979, and the latter for youths 
aged 12 to 17 years in 1997. Both cohorts were initially interviewed annually – the NLSY79 until 
1994 and the NLSY97 until 2011 – but are now followed biennially. We restrict our sample to the 
core samples of both surveys, thereby excluding the military as well as the oversample of Hispanic, 
black, and low-income youth. We further restrict our sample to include only those individuals who 
are over 16 years of age, who were not working before the sample period, who are not full-time 
students, and who are currently in dependent employment in for-profit organizations and have 
worked for more than 1,200 hours in the preceding two years. We also exclude those who work 
for no pay or who report hourly wages of less than $1, as well as observations for which the wage 
entries are clearly in error.2 Having also excised those with missing information on any of the 
                                                          
2 For example, we have a few instances of wage growth of more than 100%, followed by huge declines in the next 
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variables used in the analysis and individuals without valid Armed Services Vocational Aptitude 
Battery (ASVAB) scores, our final sample comprises 42,022 person-year observations (with 1,890 
males and 1,980 females) from the NLSY79 and 15,893 person-year observations (1,588 males 
and 1,434 females) from the NLSY97 over the survey periods analyzed. Table 1 reports the 
observation losses due to each sample inclusion criterion, while Table 2 provides basic descriptive 
statistics for our two NLSY samples.  
[Table 1 and Table 2 near here] 
In addition to its long panel nature, use of the NLSY has two other advantages. The first is 
that it effectively tracks workers’ actual labor market experience, allowing us to correct for any 
measurement error in the conventional imputed measure based on age and education (i.e. age – 
schooling – 5). The second is that it allows us to control for ability (and skills of the individuals 
across several dimensions), using the ASVAB test scores. Such measures are unavailable in 
otherwise similar panel data sets. We use the age-adjusted percentile scores of respondents on the 
subtests of the ASVAB as the basis of our individual skill measures (see the next subsection).  
 Although labor market activity has been recorded in great detail in both surveys since their 
inception, the occupations and industries are not coded consistently across each wave of either 
survey. We mapped all available NLSY79 and NLSY97 occupation codes using the guidelines 
developed by Dorn (2009) so as to be able to exploit the full extent of the data panel available. 
(Further details on occupational code mapping are given in Appendix A.)  
Measuring Match Quality 
Determination of Worker Skill Endowments and Occupational Skill Requirements  
We define individual workers’ skill mismatch as the discrepancy between their premarket skill 
                                                          
period unaccompanied by any material change in job characteristics. 
   
 
7 
 
levels and the requirements of the occupations in which they are employed. In linking the skill 
supply side (viz. workers’ endowments) with the demand side (occupational requirements), we 
exploit the tools developed by the ASVAB Career Exploration Program. This program is 
administered by the Department of Defense (DoD) with a view to helping ASVAB participants 
identify and explore suitable career possibilities in the private, public, or military sectors. Both 
NLSY surveys conducted the ASVAB tests around their inception; specifically, for the first round 
of the NLSY97 and the second year of the NLSY79. All NLSY79 respondents and about 80 
percent of the NLSY97 sample participated in the computer adaptive test of the Armed Services 
Vocational Aptitude Battery (CAT-ASVAB).3  
We consider four composite skill endowment measures: Mathematical, Verbal, Science/ 
Technological/Mechanical (STM), and Social. For the first three composites, for all those in the 
NLSY samples with valid test scores, we constructed measures using percentile ranks on select 
ASVAB subtests. Specifically, for the verbal skills composite we used the percentile scores on 
Word Knowledge and Paragraph Comprehension, for mathematical skills the scores on Arithmetic 
Reasoning and Mathematical Knowledge, and for STM skills the scores on General Science, 
Mechanical Comprehension, and Electronics Information using the weights provided by the NLS 
staff.4 We then converted these composite scores to percentile ranks, which range between 0 and 
1 (that is, from 0 to 100 percent, where, for example, 0.75 refers to the 75th percentile).5 
                                                          
3 For details of the administration of the ASVAB and CAT-ASVAB tests, the reader is referred to the NLSY79 and 
NLSY97 web pages: respectively, https://www.nlsinfo.org/content/cohorts/nlsy79/topical-guide/education/aptitude-
achievement-intelligence-scores and https://www.nlsinfo.org/content/cohorts/nlsy97/topical-guide/education/admi 
nistration-cat-asvab-0.  
4 We thank Steve McClaskie and other NLS program staff for their help in providing us with the weights and for 
assisting us with the program that creates the weighted composites. This program also adjusts the raw scores by age 
within 3-month birth cohorts.  
5 This approach is similar to that used by Guvenen et al. (2018) other than for the inclusion of STM scores. There is 
no consensus in the literature as to the construction of the ability measures. Although almost all studies utilize ASVAB 
test scores, they select different ability dimensions or different subtests for measurement of these dimensions. Our 
results were robust to variation in measurement, such as the exclusion of STM skills by Guvenen et al. (2018) and the 
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For the construction of the remaining endowment measure – social skills – we follow a 
strategy that combines the methods used by Deming (2017a) and Guvenen et al. (2018). We use 
two questions from the NLSY79 survey (specifically, the third round of the survey in 1981) where 
respondents are asked to report on their then current sociability and (retrospective) sociability at 
age 6 along with their rank on the Rotter Locus of Control Scale and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem 
Scale.6 The NLSY97 does not ask these sociability questions nor does it collect data on the Rotter 
and Rottenberg Scales. Instead, respondents are asked a series of questions to determine 
personality traits (Big 5 Personality Factors). Following Deming (2017a), we use two questions 
on extroversion and two questions on conscientiousness to construct a social skill rank comparable 
to the NLSY79 cohort’s measure. We downloaded the standardized measurements from Deming’s 
(2017b) data file, and then converted the scores to percentile ranks for each cohort of NLSY 
respondents.7 Table 3 reports descriptive statistics on the skill endowments for each NLSY cohort 
by gender and educational attainment. 
[Table 3 near here] 
In our analysis, every occupation is defined by the combination of knowledge, skill, and 
abilities (KSAs) it requires. We use the O*NET database to determine the requirements of each 
                                                          
restriction of ASVAB measured abilities to cognitive, manual and social by Lise and Postel-Vinay (2016) who analyze 
mismatch by separate ability dimensions and eschew use of an aggregate measure.  
6 The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale is a measure of self-worth while the Rotter-Locus of Control Scale is designed to 
measure the extent to which individuals believe they exercise control over their lives (the predominance of self-
determination over chance or fate). For the NLSY79 cohort, tests of these two endowments were administered in 1979 
and 1980, respectively.  
7 Deming (2017a) uses two additional questions on high school participation in clubs and sports for his analysis of 
1979 cohort data. For cohort differences, he switches to a two-question measure. As noted, we only use two sociability 
questions for the NLSY79 which is consistent with his cohort analysis. The literature displays multiple ways of 
measuring social skill or abilities. In Guvenen et al. (2018), for example, the social skill endowment is measured using 
the Rotter Locus of Control Scale and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. These authors refer to the measure as 
indicating social ability, whereas Deming (2017a) uses the label non-cognitive skills. Deming in fact uses the 
sociability questions for the NLSY79 cohort and extraversion measures for the NLSY97 cohort as his social skills 
measure. Again, our results were robust to alternative measures using either of these definitions.  
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occupation.8 For each of the ASVAB subtest scores that is used as components of the first three 
skill endowments in Table 3, there is a corresponding knowledge, skill, or ability that is associated 
with a task performed or a worker quality required in that occupation. The DoD has a mapping 
between ASVAB subtests and knowledge, ability and skill measures in O*NET which they utilize 
to assign military personnel. The mapping is also used by others, such as high school counselors 
to recommend careers to ASVAB-participating high school students. Our match quality measure 
is based on the ranking comparison strategy that is used by these groups. This mapping is provided 
in Appendix B. However, there is no social skill component to these DoD assignments. Again 
following Guvenen et al. (2018) and Deming (2017a), therefore, we constructed the occupational 
requirements of social skills using the following descriptors Social Perceptiveness, Coordination, 
Persuasion, Negotiation, Instructing, and Service Orientation taken from the O*NET database. 
We use the previously described occupational code mapping strategy for merging O*NET 
occupational characteristics with the NLSY data. 
Even though the measure of skill endowments we use is superior to the unidimensional 
measures of the previous literature, it has the limitation that worker endowments are measured pre-
labor market and do not evolve over time. For example, endowments do not change with learning 
by doing and professional education is not a component of the skill endowment set. Our favored 
interpretation would be that this skill measure is more about the potential of the worker – potential 
to learn and potential to build the set of skills required by any given occupation – than it is about 
his or her contemporaneous skills. Again, it would be preferable to have formal contemporaneous 
                                                          
8 We are using the 2007 version of the O*NET database, after Hirsch and Manzella (2015). We are indebted to Barry 
Hirsch for kindly providing us with these data. Original O*NET data grouped occupations using Standard 
Occupational Classification (SOC) codes. Hirsch and Manzella (2015) mapped these codes to COC 2002 codes. We 
once again used Dorn’s (2009) mapping to link the O*NET data on occupational KSAs to individual occupations in 
the NLSY data.  
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endowment measures (as well as measures of occupational requirements that evolve over time). 
However, since we are interested in relative realizations of the matches by gender, our mismatch 
measure may be less vulnerable to these measurement limitations if skills do not differentially 
evolve by gender. In any event, we will indirectly tackle some of these measurement issues, such 
as learning by doing, in our estimations.  
Mismatch   
The extent of skill-mismatch is measured as the absolute value of the differences between the 
percentile-rank scores of an individual’s skill endowments and the percentile-rank scores of skills 
required in that individual’s occupation.9 Specifically, let 𝐴𝑖𝑗 represent individual i’s percentile-
rank-scores in the ASVAB test for skill j (where j denotes mathematical, verbal, 
scientific/technical/mechanical skills, and social skills). Recall that 𝐴𝑖𝑗 does not vary by year or 
an individual’s occupation. Let 𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑐 denote individual i’s O*NET occupational requirements for 
skill j, in occupation c. The degree of skill mismatch for individual i for skill j, in occupation c is 
calculated as 
q𝑖𝑗𝑐 = |𝐴𝑖𝑗 − 𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑐|, 
such that the lower the value of the sum of q’s over all 4 dimensions, or aggregate mismatch, the 
better the skills are matched. In our empirical application, this aggregate mismatch measure is our 
main outcome variable. In generating this measure, we used equal weights for all skills. Our results 
were not sensitive to alternative weighting schemes. For ease of interpretation of the coefficient 
estimates, we rescaled this measure to have a standard deviation of one.  
[Table 4 near here] 
                                                          
9 We also used an alternative measure based on cosine similarity between vectors of skill endowments and skill 
requirements for robustness checks. Our results proved robust both to the use of this alternative measure as well as to 
measures using only three of the four KSAs (namely, math, verbal, and social), as in Guvenen et al. (2018). 
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Table 4 offers a descriptive view of the aggregate mismatch measure by skill dimension, 
experience, and gender for each cohort. The table offers several important pointers. First, it is more 
likely that individuals have more skills than are required rather than less (compare columns [2] 
and [5]). Second, the magnitude of over-qualification is larger than the magnitude of under-
qualification (compare columns [1] and [4]). Third, and in consequence, the probability of being 
significantly over-qualified (endowments more than one standard deviation above requirement) is 
more likely than being under-qualified (compare columns [3] and [6]). We also observe, as 
expected, that the severity of over-qualification (see column [1]) decreases over the course of 
individual careers for the older cohort.10 Moreover, among workers with more than 10 years of 
experience, the share of those who are over-qualified is lower. On the other hand, the share of 
those who are under-qualified is mostly higher. In what follows, we shall mainly concentrate on 
the size of mismatch and the effect of mismatch on wage outcomes. However, we will also create 
dummy indicators to identify the direction of mismatch and test whether women are more likely 
to be over-qualified. We will also investigate whether or not the quantity of mismatch and wage 
effects of mismatch differ by skill type. 
Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework guiding our thinking is similar to that outlined in Guvenen et al. (2018), 
but containing additional layers to accommodate gender and cohort differences. In their setup, an 
individual worker’s productivity is a positive function of match quality. As a result, all else equal, 
individuals will choose the job where they believe they are better matched. They update their 
beliefs about their abilities given the matches they experience and move to improve match quality 
as and when they can.  
                                                          
10 It will be recalled that the 1997 Cohort is still young, with the average worker having less than 10 years of experience.  
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The first additional layer is inspired by Goldin (2014), who identifies differences in the 
need for flexibility as an unresolved source of gender wage disparities. As noted earlier, some 
workers desire the amenity of flexibility or lower hours and some firms may find it cheaper to 
provide that flexibility. Thus, individuals place different values on the amenity of temporal 
flexibility while firms or sectors confront different costs of supplying that amenity. As a result, 
Goldin argues that the hours-wage relation may be nonlinear and convex. We would further argue 
that these flexible jobs are not offered across the range of skills and for all tasks. As a result, when 
life events such as birth of a child occur and alter preferences for flexibility, workers face a 
restrictive set of occupations that accommodate this need and they may end up in an occupation 
for which they are over- or under-qualified. In our view, workers facing such flexibility/match 
quality tradeoffs are more likely to be women and, given our data patterns, are more likely to be 
over-qualified. The tradeoffs result in wage losses not only by reason of compensating 
differentials, and the above-mentioned nonlinear and convex relationship between hours and 
wages, but also because the workers in question are underutilized in their jobs. Given the findings 
in the literature, they are more likely to be underutilized in terms of math and technical skills, 
which happen to be those with the highest wage rewards. 
The second layer involves household decision making after Frank (1978). If females are 
secondary breadwinners, once their husbands make optimal job search decisions involving a shift 
in location, the wife also moves regardless of the job opportunities at the new location. Vulgo: she 
is a ‘tied mover.’ Equally, the wife will be a ‘tied stayer’ if her husband has optimized his job 
search in the current location. In either case, the female partner may be expected to confront a 
worse match and a higher risk of being over-qualified. Although we do not formally formulate and 
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structurally estimate a model of flexibility and differential over-qualification, we test implications 
of the above framework using reduced form specifications.  
Econometric Analysis 
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Beginning with the NLSY79 cohort, we first document the 
determinants of the magnitude of the total amount of mismatch in the labor market. For this older 
cohort we next seek to gauge the size of the gender difference and how life events – marriage, 
child birth, and their timing – affect worker-occupation match quality. We also examine how the 
need for flexibility and household decision dynamics may play a role in this process. Only then do 
we evaluate the cost of being mismatched in terms of lost wages, and ask how much of gender 
wage disparities by educational level can be explained by workers’ history of match quality.  
We also look at the NLSY97 outcomes. Although this cohort is too young to have 
experienced extended labor market histories, we can compare it with the NLSY79 for early-career 
outcomes. Specifically, we shall test whether or not, all else equal, the two cohorts display different 
match quality by gender in this early-career phase.  
Finally, returning to the NLSY79 cohort, we analyze match quality and the wage effects of 
match quality by skill type. Specifically, we investigate whether mismatch differs by skill type and 
if there are any gender differences in this regard. The wage penalties from mismatch associated 
with each skill type are also examined. 
Gender and Mismatch 
We first consider the role of gender in mismatch in Table 5, where the dependent variable is the 
total amount of mismatch. The first column of the table includes only the female dummy. This 
specification reveals no significant gender differences in match quality. We next allow the 
relationship to differ by education status (but condition on nothing else); specifically, we 
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distinguish between persons with at least a college degree and those individuals without one. It 
now emerges that women with less than a college degree are less mismatched while more educated 
women are more mismatched than their male counterparts. For the less well educated group, the 
match quality gender difference is about 7 percent of a standard deviation in favor of females. 
Women with college degree or higher educational level, on the other hand, are found to have on 
average about 9 percent of a standard deviation (0.0876 = 0.1588 - 0.0712) greater mismatch than 
men with at least a college degree. For their part, males of the higher educational attainment group 
are about 17 percent of a standard deviation less mismatched than their less well educated 
counterparts.  
When, in the third column of the table, we include individual characteristics such as race 
and adjust for the individual’s own skill endowments and the skill requirements of the occupation, 
two interesting things happen. First, the match quality advantage of less well educated females 
over males of similar educational attainment is reduced and is no longer statistically significant. 
Second, the match quality difference between highly educated and less well educated males 
deepens by about 10 percentage points to 26 percent of a standard deviation, indicating that some 
of the mismatch is masked if one does not factor in individual differences in human capital and 
occupational requirements. In our baseline specification, given in the fourth column of the table, 
where we also control for the labor market experience and occupational and employer level tenure 
of the worker in quadratic form, and their interaction with the individual’s average skill scores and 
occupational requirements, these effects are largely unchanged. Here, we observe that females 
with a college or more education have on average 12 percent of a standard deviation greater skill 
mismatch (0.1184 = 0.1509 - 0.0325) than their male counterparts with the same educational level. 
For those individuals without a college degree, on the other hand, the gender difference in extent 
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of mismatch (-0.0325) is not statistically significant. To repeat an earlier point, for males having 
at least a college education significantly reduces occupational mismatch by a little more than 26 
percent of a standard deviation. The role of education in reducing mismatch is not as important 
among females – at only 11 percent of a standard deviation (-0.1092 = -0.2649 + 0.1509).  
[Table 5 near here] 
 There is one obvious issue that remains to be addressed. Individuals with greater labor 
market attachment may have better match outcomes, while good matches may lead to longer 
tenures in occupations and more years in the labor market. We approach this endogeneity problem 
by instrumenting for employer tenure, occupational tenure, and total experience. Following Altonji 
and Shakotko (1987) and Guvenen et al. (2018), we instrument individuals’ employer tenure and 
occupational tenure variables with their deviations from spell-specific means, controlling for the 
possibility of multiple spells of employment with the same employer or in the same occupation.11 
Total labor market experience is instrumented in a similar fashion. The fifth column in Table 5 
reports results for this IV specification. For the estimates that are of principal interest we observe 
no significant change in magnitude or sign vis-à-vis the baseline specification.12  
                                                          
11 𝐼𝑉𝑒𝑚𝑝 = 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝 − 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   and 𝐼𝑉𝑜𝑐𝑐 = 𝑇𝑜𝑐𝑐 − 𝑇𝑜𝑐𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, where 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is the average duration for individual 𝑖 with the same 
employer 𝑘 and  𝑇𝑜𝑐𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is the average duration for individual 𝑖 with the same occupation j; 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖,𝑘,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1  , 
where 𝑇 is the total number of spells that an individual is observed with the same employer;  𝑇𝑜𝑐𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑇𝑜𝑐𝑐 𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑁
𝑡=1  , 
where 𝑁 is the total number of spells that an individual is observed with the same occupation j. Total experience is 
also instrumented in the same way, with an instrument 𝐼𝑉𝑒𝑥𝑝 = 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑝 − 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, where 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is the average duration that 
individual 𝑖  remains in the labor market and 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑝̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =
1
𝑆
∑ 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑆
𝑡=1 , 𝑆  being the total number of spells that an 
individual is observed to be in the labor market. For example, if an employer has a 3-year spell with an employer, in 
the first year the value of the instrument will be -1, in the second year it will be 0, and in the third year it will be 1, 
because 2 is the average experience over these three years of observations ((1+2+3)/3). 
12 This instrumentation strategy, although commonly used, is not an ideal one. It relies heavily on the assumption that 
fixed components of the error terms can be linearly decomposed and that there is no correlation between the fixed 
effects corresponding to different tenure and experience variables. In simulation exercises, Pavan (2011) has shown 
that such IV estimates can be strongly biased when these assumptions fail. He also points out that the bias is almost 
non-existent for workers with at least a college education. Thus, we incline to view that our estimates for the college 
educated are unaffected. Given the bias documented for the non-college educated, however, we will refrain from 
overstating insignificant results for this group. Our maintained hypothesis is that these endogeneity issue are likely 
gender neutral and do not affect our conclusions regarding mismatch and gender.  
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Another concern is the role of part-time jobs in influencing match quality. Our sample 
restrictions were designed to lead to the inclusion of only those individuals with sufficiently strong 
labor market attachment. However, as our 1,200 hours a year restriction roughly translates into 25 
hours a week, the sample will certainly include some part-timers (about 15 percent). The last two 
IV model estimates in Table 5 seek to discover whether part-timers are different from full-timers. 
It can be seen that gender differences in match quality are less pronounced for part-timers than for 
full-timers. For example, female college graduates who are employed part-time are not 
significantly more mismatched than their male counterparts, which is in sharp contrast with the 
results for full-timers. Females may be less likely to remain employed full time after life events 
such as birth of a child, but there are no obvious mismatch implications of this particular change 
in status. This may be because better matched college graduate females may be those who stay in 
their jobs with reduced hours while their worse matched counterparts cannot and eventually drop 
out. Yet our part-timers may not be representative of all part-timers given their likely stronger 
labor market attachment. Accordingly, even if it is abundantly clear that part-timers are not driving 
our results, this recognition does not eliminate the need for a separate and specific examination of 
part-time work and mismatch in future work.  
The Role of Household Formation and Fertility 
Whenever gender disparities are of concern, it is imperative to discuss how gender roles, family 
formation, and fertility contribute to the particular disparity in question. The descriptive 
association between fertility and match quality is graphed in Figure 1 for the NLSY79 cohort. The 
figure maps match quality (as described in the preceding section) first for all males and all females, 
and then for college graduates only, through the timeline of the first birth. That is, normalizing the 
employment timeline of a worker around the birth of the first child, there is clear evidence of an 
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up-tick in female worker mismatch in both panels of the figure. By contrast, over the same 
timeline, male worker matches actually improve, especially among those with a college degree. 
 Now this descriptive look at the fertility-mismatch relation is likely biased. Fertility, 
marriage and mismatch maybe endogenously determined while there is selection in who marries 
and who chooses to have a child. Controlling for possible confounding factors and addressing these 
endogeneity issues, Table 6 offers an initial look at the effect of marriage and fertility on the size 
of mismatch. Three empirical models are presented. The first addresses the issue of endogeneity 
in respect of the tenure and experience variables mentioned earlier (see the pooled IV specification 
in Table 5). The second exploits the panel nature of our data and addresses the possibility of 
unobserved individual heterogeneity within a fixed effects setup. Here we rely on within-variation 
to identify the effect of marriage and children on occupational match quality, specifically changes 
in marital status and the birth of the first child. The third and final model combines efforts to 
alleviate both concerns in reporting estimates from fixed effects-instrumental variables 
regressions.  
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[Table 6 near here]  
 The first column of pooled IV regressions in Table 6 suggests that females with at least 
one child are on average 10 percent of a standard deviation more mismatched than are males with 
at least one child. For females, having a child is associated with an increase in mismatch about 7 
percent (0.0664 = 0.0971 - 0.0307) of a standard deviation relative to childless females. The effect 
of simply having a child is much smaller, and is in fact not statistically significant for males (-
0.0307). For its part, marriage is not significantly related to mismatch. In the fixed effects 
specifications, the effect of fertility is more pronounced for females. Women who have at least one 
child are about 11 percent of a standard deviation more mismatched than their childless female 
counterparts and 13 to 14 percent of a standard deviation more mismatched than their male 
counterparts. Gender specific regressions reaffirm the role of children in increasing mismatch for 
females (10 to 11 percent of a standard deviation in the last two specifications) while the effect is 
still negative and non-significant for males. 
[Table 7 near here] 
Our descriptive statistics provided in Table 4 suggested that mismatch mostly takes the 
form of being over-qualified for the occupation that one holds. In other words, the phenomenon of 
having more skills than can be utilized is more common in the data and is arguably the more 
common problem faced by females if family-related issues are the source. For this reason, the 
incidence of over-qualification is the outcome of interest in Table 7. Specifically, our concern is 
with “significant over-qualification,” which we define as having at least one standard deviation 
more in endowments than is required for the occupation. We report that the odds ratio of being 
over-qualified for females with children over females without children is 1.95; that is, females 
with children are almost twice as likely to be over-qualified. For males, on the other hand, having 
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children does not significantly affect the odds of being over-qualified. Moreover, marriage alone 
has no significant effect on the probability of being over-qualified for either gender.  
[Table 8 near here] 
 Tables 6 and 7 have shown that main reason for mismatch among females is fertility, with 
children affecting female and male mismatch differently. To understand the dynamics of the 
fertility-mismatch relationship, we next consider in Table 8 the change in mismatch along the 
fertility timeline, again for the NLSY79 cohort. For an interval extending up to six years after the 
first birth, females make worse matches than they did within 3 years prior to that birth event. The 
disparity is approximately 6 percent of a standard deviation in the OLS results, 8 percent of a 
standard deviation for the IV-FE regression,13 and up to 10 percent of a standard deviation in the 
case of the FE-only regression. The opposite holds for men, with the extent of mismatch declining 
significantly within the 6 years following the birth of the first child. More than 6 years after the 
birth of the first child, the extent of mismatch is even higher for females, but no significant changes 
are detected for men.                      
[Table 9 near here] 
          The above findings imply that the increment in mismatch shortly following the first birth 
may accumulate, leading to even greater mismatch later in a woman’s career. It is therefore of no 
small interest to explore whether a delay in fertility might reduce the size of mismatch induced by 
parenthood. To this end, we measure the “timing of the first birth” in two different ways: firstly, 
by the mother’s age at the first birth; and, secondly, by the number of years that have elapsed 
between entry to the labor market and that first birth. Considering the possible endogeneity 
between fertility timing and quality of the occupational match, we now instrument for both timing 
                                                          
13 Here we are only instrumenting for the tenure and experience variables, and utilize the FE setup to access the issues 
of endogeneity and selection in fertility.  
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measures using the age of the individual respondent’s sibling at the first birth.14 In a second set of 
regressions (IV-2) we also instrument for the individual’s occupation and employer tenure and job 
market experience in the manner described earlier. The estimates are reported in Table 9. We see 
that delaying the time of birth significantly reduces the amount of mismatch for women (by about 
3 to 4 percent of a standard deviation per year), but no significant effects are observed for men in 
either instrumental variables setup. When comparing the IV results with the OLS estimates, we 
can conclude that the age at first birth is endogenous with respect to the degree of occupational 
mismatch. Overall, the OLS estimates are biased upwards; that is, ignoring endogeneity clearly 
underestimates the gains in match quality resulting from a delay in childbirth – at least for some 
women. It might also be the case there is selection into delayed fertility by individuals who would 
otherwise suffer the biggest losses. Unfortunately, our empirical strategy cannot decide this 
important issue.  
Occupational Flexibility and Mismatch  
We next test whether a Goldin-type explanation has any purchase when it comes to mismatch. To 
this end, we constructed an occupational “flexibility score,” which is the average of five O*NET 
working context measures: time pressure, contact with others, establishing and maintaining 
interpersonal relationships, structured vs. unstructured work, and freedom to make decisions.15 
                                                          
14 This is not one of the instruments commonly used in the literature but is the only one that is available for both men 
and women in our data set. It has been documented that siblings’ fertility behavior is highly correlated (Lyngstrad and 
Prskawetz 2010). More specifically, it has been suggested that shared upbringing, close social interactions with 
siblings, and peer effects result in a positive relationship between the individual’s own birth timing and that of his or 
her sibling. This instrument passes all the tests to be a valid instrument. We present the first stage results in Table D.1. 
These indicate that age at first birth variables are only endogenous for females. Thus, we present IV estimates only 
for females. Estimates using miscarriages as an instrument for motherhood timing after Miller (2011) are also 
presented in Tables D.2 and D.3. These estimates imply even stronger results than do ours. However, this variable is 
only available for women and for the 1979 sample alone. 
15 The five O*NET working context measurements are defined as follows: (i) Time pressure: how often does this job 
require the worker to meet strict deadlines? The higher the raw score, the lower the flexibility; (ii) Contact with others: 
how much does this job require the worker to be in contact with others (face-to-face, by telephone, or otherwise) in 
order to perform it? The higher the score, the lower the flexibility; (iii) Establishing and maintaining interpersonal 
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The higher the score, the more flexible is the occupation. In Table 10, we see that among those 
persons with at least one child, a one standard deviation more flexible job is associated with a 
(roughly) 4 percent of a standard deviation higher degree of mismatch for males and a 6 percent 
of a standard deviation higher degree of mismatch for females.  
[Table 10 near here] 
 To illustrate the relationship between occupational flexibility and mismatch over the first 
birth timeline in Figure 2 we plot the predicted amount of mismatch at different points on the 
fertility timeline for first-time parents in the highly flexible and highly inflexible occupations 
(respectively, the 90th and 10th percentile flexibility values as observed in the data). The figure 
shows how females gravitate to work in occupations offering high flexibility at the expense of a 
                                                          
relationships: developing constructive and cooperative working relationships with others, and maintaining them over 
time. The higher the score, the lower the flexibility; (iv) Structured vs. unstructured work: to what extent is this job 
structured for the worker, rather than allowing the worker to determine tasks, priorities, and goals? The higher the 
score, the higher the flexibility; and, (v) Freedom to make decisions: How much decision making freedom, without 
supervision, does the job offer? The higher the score, the higher the flexibility. Each element is standardized to have 
a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 in the O*NET data. To arrive at the flexibility score, we took the negative 
of the first three measurements, and obtained an average score for the five measure across all occ1990dd occupations. 
We then rescaled this score to have a standard deviation of 1. 
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better skill match after childbirth. No such pattern is observed for males. The estimates used in the 
figure to capture the relationship between mismatch and occupational flexibility over the first birth 
timeline are provided in Table D.1.  
Wages and Mismatch 
Thus far we have shown that, contrary to the prediction of search models, women’s match quality 
does not improve over the course of their careers. Women, and especially the most educated among 
them, are more mismatched than their male counterparts. Following Guvenen et al. (2018), but 
now for both genders, we chart in Table 11 the wage loss associated with this mismatch. Also as 
in Guvenen et al., we model the wage loss associated with the total extent of mismatch along three 
dimensions: (a) a threshold penalty, (b) a decreasing return over the career path, and (c) a wage 
penalty associated with cumulative past mismatch.16  
In Table 11 outcome variable is log real hourly wage (in 2002 dollars). In the first column 
of this table we only include the measure of mismatch in the current occupation.17 Our results 
imply for males that an individual who is one standard deviation worse matched than the average 
amount of mismatch will earn 5 percent less (-0.0236*2) than an individual who is one standard 
deviation better matched than the average. The wage effect is a little less for females at 4.4 percent 
([-0.0236 + 0.0014] * 2), although the gender difference in the effect of mismatch on wages is not 
                                                          
16 We calculate cumulative mismatch in the same manner as do Guvenen et al. (2018); that is, as the weighted average 
of past mismatches, where the weights are formulated as the length of tenure in a given occupation over the total labor 
market experience. Strictly speaking, this is not cumulative mismatch but rather “average past mismatch.” However, 
to maintain consistency with the extant literature, we shall continue to refer to it as cumulative mismatch. 
17 Here we are only reporting the results for the instrumental variables specifications used subsequently for our wage 
gap calculations. In these regressions, in order to distinguish the first year of the first spell with a new employer from 
the first years in later spells, an old job dummy is created (viz. oldjob equals 1 if the current employer is an employer 
the worker had in the past, which will only be zero at the first year of the first spell) and also instrumented as are the 
occupation tenure and experience variables. Specifically, 𝐼𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑗𝑜𝑏 = 𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑗𝑜𝑏 − 𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑗𝑜𝑏̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅, where 𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑗𝑜𝑏̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ =
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑗𝑜𝑏𝑖,𝑘,𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 , 
where 𝑇 is the total number of spells that an individual is observed with the same employer. 
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significant in this specification. When we add the occupation tenure interactions to capture 
differences in returns along the career path, the threshold effect declines but these added interaction 
terms are not significant. However, when the cumulative mismatch – that is, the measured history 
of mismatch, as described above – is added to the model (the third column of results) the effect of 
current mismatch becomes insignificant. Cumulative mismatch, on the other hand, implies a 12 
percent lower (-0.0598*2) wage for males who have a one standard deviation worse than average 
match history compared with those with a one standard deviation better than average match history 
all else constant. Cumulative mismatch in this model does not have differential effects on female 
wages.  
[Table 11 near here] 
Next, in the fourth column of the table, we add the education dimension by differentiating 
between individuals without a college degree and those with at least a college degree. Our results 
indicate that, on average, college graduates suffer much stronger current and cumulative mismatch 
wage penalties than their less well educated counterparts. A one standard deviation higher than 
average current mismatch implies a higher wage penalty for college graduates of about 3 percent 
for males and 4.8 percent for females on average. And cumulative mismatch has a somewhat 
stronger wage penalty for males (5.1 percent) but not for females (4 percent), again relative to non-
college graduates. 
Similar differences in wage penalties are reported by educational levels for the gender-
specific regressions in the last two columns of Table 11. Even though current mismatch does not 
imply a significant wage penalty for either males or females among non-college graduates, for 
college graduates of both genders a one standard deviation greater mismatch implies about 4 
percent lower wages (-0.0362 in the case of males and -0.0429 for females) on average during the 
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first year in an occupation. Although female college graduates experience lower wage losses then 
their non-college educated counterparts who are equally mismatched over their tenure (a 
coefficient of 0.0029), no such significant differences are observed among males. For its part, 
cumulative mismatch is more punishing for males and females with college degrees relative to 
their non-college educated counterparts, albeit only significantly so in the case of males.  
Thus far, we have shown that the extent of total skill mismatch for females increases after  
the first birth and deteriorates when the first child is older and there are potentially more children 
in the household. We also demonstrated that cumulative mismatch has a more detrimental effect 
than current mismatch. Although there are no significant gender differences in the effect of 
mismatch on wages, greater current and cumulative past mismatch for females may contribute to 
the increasing wage disparities between males and females over a career. To illustrate the 
magnitude and persistence of wage effects of gender disparities in match quality we conduct a 
simple exercise. In Figure 3 we link the gender difference in mismatch and wage penalties to both 
current mismatch and cumulative mismatch. Distinguishing here between college educated and 
non-college educated individuals, we chart the progression of gender wage disparities over 
different stages of a career at 10 year intervals (vis. 10 years, 20 years and 30 years of experience) 
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that can be attributed to match quality alone. We do so separately for those individuals with the 
best and worst early career matches.18 We see that gender disparities due to mismatch are most 
pronounced for college graduates with the best early career matches. Female college graduates 
with the best early career matches earn approximately 7 percent less than their male counterparts 
after 30 years with average current and cumulative mismatch experience. The gap due to mismatch 
is little over 2 percent after 30 years among the worst early career matches in this group. On the 
other hand, irrespective of the quality of early career matches, gender wage gaps are muted for 
those without a college education.  
 Given our earlier findings regarding the role of fertility delay in mismatch experience, we 
can also visualize the wage penalty that can be attributed to motherhood for different schooling 
levels and by different ages at the first birth. Figure 4 first graphs the implied wage differences at 
                                                          
18 Early match quality is determined according to an individual’s mismatch over the first 5 years of experience. A 
distinction is drawn between the top (worst matched) and bottom (best matched) deciles of the mismatch distribution. 
Current and past mismatch values are averages for the groups with the given levels of experience and early career 
match quality, assuming this experience is also equal to occupational tenure. From Table 11 we see that for both 
educational groups wage growth is not materially influenced by the degree of mismatch (captured by the coefficient 
of the occupation tenure and mismatch interaction). Disparities between occupational tenure and experience will not 
affect Figure 3 as calculations for this figure use only the significant coefficients. Calculations used in assembling 
Figure 3 are presented in Table D.2.  
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different points on fertility timeline for college graduate females who have given birth to their first 
child at age 25 and at age 30 relative to their otherwise identical counterparts who have not given 
birth. It then repeats the same exercise for females with less than a college degree. According to 
this figure, the motherhood wage penalty due to mismatch is higher among the college graduates, 
and especially those who have given birth early. Specifically, a female college graduate who gave 
birth to her first child at age 25 would earn about 4 percent less by age 30 – 5 years after her first 
birth –  than her counterpart who gave first birth at age 30 at the same point on fertility timeline 
(at age 35).  
Cohort Differences  
For this next part of our analysis we use only those NLSY79 observations for respondents when 
they were aged 33 years or younger. In this way, we have a sample comparable to the NLSY97 
and can combine the two cohorts. We capture the differences across cohorts with a NLSY97 
dummy used both by itself and in interaction with other variables of interest. Table 12 examines 
cohort differences in mismatch and over-qualification. For the ‘younger cohort’ (NLSY97), we 
see that college-educated females continue to be more mismatched and more likely to be over-
qualified than their male counterparts (0.0328 of a standard deviation more mismatched and with 
about one percentage point higher probability of being over-qualified),19 although in neither case 
significantly so. On the other hand, among those without college degrees, females are less 
mismatched (almost 4 percent of a standard deviation in the case of the NLSY79 and more than 7 
percent of a standard deviation for the NLSY97). They are also less likely to be over-qualified than 
their male counterparts of both generations: about 1.4 percentage points less in the case of the 
NLSY79 and about 2.5 percentage points less for the NLSY97. Finally, Table 12 suggests that 
                                                          
19 See Appendix E for a comprehensive comparison of predicted probabilities.  
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among both college graduates and non-college graduates the younger cohort of both genders 
perform worse, recording greater skill mismatch and a higher incidence of over-qualification on 
average than their older counterparts.  
 [Table 12 near here] 
 Table 13 compares the role of fertility and its timing on mismatch across cohorts. It is 
apparent that younger-cohort men display a greater amount of mismatch after having a child than 
does the older cohort of males (5.64 percent of a standard deviation more), while the opposite is 
true for women of that cohort (8.03 percent of a standard deviation less). Relative to the older 
cohort of males, they are more mismatched within 6 years following the birth of the first child 
when compared to the baseline interval of up to 3 years before birth (5.19 percent of a standard 
deviation), although this large effect is imprecisely estimated. This pattern is in strong contrast to 
what was observed for older cohorts, where males became better matched after having had a child, 
especially when the children were young (about 4 percent of a standard deviation in Table 8, and 
roughly 2 percent of a standard deviation, albeit statistically insignificant, here in the Table 13 
regression). This shift implies that male millennials have assumed more family responsibilities 
than did the male baby-boomers before them. For younger-cohort females with at least one child, 
mismatch is less than that reported for their counterparts in the older-cohort (about 8 percent of a 
standard deviation less). With respect to the fertility timeline, we observe that younger-cohort 
females are also less mismatched more than 6 years after the first birth than the corresponding 
group of older-cohort females, although the coefficient estimate is statistically insignificant.  
[Table 13 near here] 
        We next check to see if this slight shift in the gender burden of mismatch is due to the fact 
that women are today more engaged in the labor market, and have in the words of Goldin (2014) 
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achieved a grand convergence in human capital attributes that has made them equally if not more 
productive than men. According to a recent BLS (2017) report, the share of women earning more 
than their husbands has increased by more than 60 percent over the last several decades. Table 14 
seeks to determine whether this shift might underpin our observed cohort differences. It may also 
be seen as offering a test of Frank’s (1978) theory of differential over-qualification. That is to say, 
in the table we examine whether being a breadwinner decreases the level of mismatch in 
households with and without children. Comparing the IV and IV-FE results, we first see that some 
of the breadwinner status effects are explained away once we use within-variation for 
identification. For example, in the case of males without a child, being a breadwinner implies a 10 
percent of a standard deviation reduction in the amount of mismatch using the IV specification. 
Once we consider individual fixed factors however, not only is the magnitude of this effect greatly 
reduced (from 0.1008 to 0.0104), but also it is no longer statistically significant. For the fixed 
effects-only models, it is apparent that not only are female breadwinners less mismatched than 
their non-breadwinner counterparts but also that the breadwinner effect is modestly stronger for 
the NLSY97 cohort of females. For the NLSY79 male cohort there is some indication that being a 
breadwinner with at least one child may reduce mismatch, but this is nowhere the case for the 
younger cohort of males.  
[Table 14 near here] 
Mismatch by Skill 
The most recent literature suggests that the effects of mismatch might differ by the type of skill 
for which the worker is mismatched (Guvenen 2018; Lise and Postel-Vinay 2016). In particular, 
most studies suggest the wage penalties appear highest for cognitive skills. Workers can make up 
for the manual and routine skills that they lack, but cognitive skills when under-qualified are harder 
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to rectify. Also, when over-qualified, unrealized returns to cognitive skills are higher than for all 
other skill dimensions. Thus, one pressing question for our own inquiry is whether gender 
differences in mismatch vary by skill type; another is whether the wage effects of mismatch also 
differentiated by skill.  
[Table 15 near here] 
Using IV-FE models, the upper panel of Table 15 examines gender differences in mismatch 
by skill type and education level, and how fertility might compound these gender differences. We 
see that among non-college graduates, females are 4.98 percent of a standard deviation more 
mismatched in terms of Math skills than their non-college educated male counterparts when they 
have a child. There is an even larger gender difference in the extent of mismatch for STM skills in 
the presence of children for non-college graduates; compared with their male counterparts with at 
least one child, these females are 8.94 percent of a standard deviation more mismatched. This 
particular gender effect is not as strong in the case of college-educated individuals and the 
coefficient estimate is statistically insignificant (although its magnitude is large at 6.21 percent of 
a standard deviation). For Math skills, however, gender differences are significant: among college 
graduates with at least one child, females are about 11 percent of a standard deviation more 
mismatched than their male counterparts. 
Turning to the gender-specific models, we see that non-college educated women who have 
at least one child are also significantly more mismatched across all skill dimensions compared 
with their childless counterparts by about 8 to 11 percent of a standard deviation. For their part, 
non-college educated males with at least one child are significantly more mismatched compared 
with their childless counterparts in Math skills, while college educated males are significantly less 
mismatched throughout (other than in the case of Social skills).  
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 The results for over-qualification, shown in the lower panel of the table, are frankly mixed. 
In the important category of Math skills, however, college-educated women are also more likely 
to be over-qualified when compared with both their male counterparts and childless women.  
[Table 16 near here] 
 Finally, Table 16 seeks to isolate the wage consequences of mismatch by skill type. As 
before, we look at the question both in terms of current and past match quality, and distinguish 
three sources of effect. Similar to our earlier results, when occupational tenure-mismatch 
interaction is considered, evidence of any threshold mismatch effect for Math skills for males 
disappears. However, for females on average we observe a negative and significant threshold 
mismatch effect for STM skills, although this disappears after about 5 years of tenure. Also as 
before, cumulative mismatch has the biggest wage penalties across all skill types. And similar to 
the findings of the literature, we report that cumulative mismatch in terms of Math skills has the 
largest wage effects for males. For females, on the other hand, penalties are lower for Math 
cumulative mismatch but are of the same order of magnitude for cumulative mismatch on Verbal 
and Social skills.  
Conclusions 
This study has examined match quality by gender and different cohorts using the NLSY79 and the 
NLSY97. It extends the empirical methodology of Guvenen et al. (2018) in which skill mismatch 
is based on the discrepancy between the portfolio of skills required by an occupation and the 
portfolio of abilities possessed by the worker for learning those skills. Worker abilities or skill 
endowments are captured by ASVAB scores, occupational requirements are documented in 
O*NET database, and these two dimensions are linked using a DoD mapping.  
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Although our methodology improves on past mismatch arguments based on average years 
of schooling undertaken and the schooling required, or the use of self-reported indicators of 
mismatch, a number of limitations attach to our mismatch construct. First, skill endowments are 
fixed, having a basis in a test administered in adolescence. Second, there are unmeasured changes 
in occupational requirements over time. Ideally we would have a more contemporaneous measure 
of endowments and skill requirements. However, although skill endowment is formally fixed, a 
major focus of our study is to track how life events in the form of marriage and child birth affect 
the skill match quality for workers. Also, it will be recalled that in the regressions for match quality 
and for wages we include an interaction term between individuals’ skill endowment and their 
occupational tenure to capture potential on-the-job learning.  
However, the latter observation raises the vexed question of the exogeneity of tenure as the 
tenure variable is likely to be correlated with individual and match specific factors. In seeking to 
tackle this issue, we follow Guvenen et al. (2018) in using an instrumental variables strategy 
pioneered by Altonji and Shakotko (1987). The instrument chosen – the deviation from 
individuals’ average length of tenure in that occupation – is the best we can do given the nature of 
our data set and should satisfy the exogenous variation condition. It has been criticized by Pavan 
(2011), who argues that (within the framework of a two-stage search model) IV estimates of this 
type underestimate the effect of firm-specific job matches. Even if there is no obvious way of 
adopting his particular estimation strategy with the data at our disposal, Pavan’s reservations do 
have to be borne in mind in interpreting our results.  
Some imprecision also attaches to our modeling of the interaction of fertility and mismatch. 
In recognition that the respondent’s match quality might influence the timing of the birth rather 
than the other way round, we also instrumented the timing of the first birth. As an instrument we 
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used the age of the respondent’s sibling at first birth. This instrument has the advantage of being 
available for both male and female respondents in our data unlike alternatives from the literature. 
It has been documented that siblings’ fertility behavior is highly correlated (Lyngstrad and 
Prskawetz 2010). More specifically, it has been suggested that shared upbringing, close social 
interactions with siblings, and peer effects result in a positive relationship between the individual’s 
own birth timing and that of his or her sibling. We find in our first stage regressions evidence 
supportive of this contention. Thus, our instrument satisfies the inclusion restriction. Necessarily 
more problematic is of course negotiating the exclusion restriction, although concerns that our 
instrument is correlated with the outcome of mismatch or any other unobserved determinant of 
that outcome are mitigated by the detailed controls in our regressions.  
We also investigated other possible instruments. Two alternatives instruments are “twin 
births” and “miscarriages,” We eschewed use of the former as an instrument (on which, see Öberg 
2017), given that twin births will not capture the match quality change for workers giving birth to 
the first child, which event is a major concern of the present study. And although miscarriages are 
by no means an ideal instrument – for example, Fletcher and Wolfe (2009) argue that they may 
not be random events and are likely correlated with unobserved community-level factors and are 
only available for females – we decided to experiment with this fertility shock variable. We 
reported that the results of this procedure were qualitatively similar to those obtained using age of 
the respondent’s sibling at first birth.  
Despite our various attempts to tackle biases such as endogeneity, selection, and 
unobserved heterogeneity, our methodology should be viewed as providing a detailed descriptive 
approach rather than establishing definitive causal associations. Our intent has been to provide a 
wide-ranging empirical discussion of gender and mismatch over a career within a framework that 
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tells us something more about the mechanisms through which gender gaps emerge and lays the 
ground for the adoption of a more causal approach in subsequent research.  
Our key results may be adumbrated as follows. First, females are more mismatched than 
males, and this result is driven by the greater mismatch among highly-educated females. Second, 
females with at least one child evince greater mismatch relative to their male counterparts and to 
females with no children. Third, marriage per se is unrelated to mismatch. Fourth, there is a degree 
of persistence in mismatch for females. Their mismatch persists for up to six years after the first 
birth, and even increases thereafter. For males, on the other hand, mismatch declines within the 
former interval, with no significant change thereafter. Fifth, delaying the time of childbirth reduces 
mismatch for females. Sixth, mismatch is greater for those individuals with children and in more 
flexible occupations. Although this is true for both genders, the tendency is altogether stronger for 
females. Seventh, mismatch results in lower earnings for both genders. The wage loss comprises 
three elements: current mismatch, a reduced return to tenure, and cumulative past mismatch 
(strictly, the weighted average of past mismatches). The biggest penalties accrue to accumulated 
mismatches and among those who are college educated. Eighth, although there is no significant 
gender difference in the effect of mismatch on wages, greater current and accumulated mismatch 
do contribute to increasing wage disparities between females and males over a career. Specifically, 
between 1 percentage point and 7 percentage points of the gender wage gap stem from current and 
accumulated mismatch, with the higher (lower) value corresponding to those with the best (worst) 
early career matches. Ninth, there is evidence of greater mismatch in mathematical skills for 
females, especially among college graduates with at least one child, who are also more likely to 
be over-qualified than their male counterparts in this dimension. However, males seem to 
experience higher wage penalty for mismatch in mathematical skills. That said, the effects of 
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mismatch on wages in the cases of other skills are mostly muted for both genders. Lastly, younger 
cohorts of females appear to be doing better in terms of mismatch than their precursors although 
the reverse is the case for males; these cohort results offering some support to Goldin’s notion of 
grand convergence and Frank’s theory of differential over-qualification.  
 Some broader themes of our research findings might also be noted. Our results on skill 
mismatch by skill type might well suggest that, in certain fields, gender segregation and 
discrimination continue to apply. Another explanation for this disproportionate female mismatch 
is undoubtedly the division of labor in the household and traditional gender roles. Our results 
indicate that, after giving birth, highly-educated women trade off flexibility for match quality and 
are underemployed. This tradeoff between flexibility and wages is a problem that cannot be 
explained away by a compensating differentials model. This is because jobs offering flexibility are 
not distributed evenly across the occupational spectrum. The end result is the under-utilization of 
a material share of labor market participants.  
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Appendix A: Occupational Codes in the NLSY Surveys and Mapping across Different 
Coding Systems 
Until 1981 all occupations and industries in the NLSY79 were coded using 1970 Census codes 
(Census Occupational Classifications/COCs and Census Industrial Classifications/CICs, 
respectively). Beginning with the 1982 survey, occupations were coded using the 1980 Census 
codes, in addition to the 1970 codes, until 2002. After that year, the 2002 COC was used to code 
occupations, and subsequent to the 2010 round the 2010 COCs were also provided. For its part, 
even though the first five rounds of the NLSY97 employed 1990 codes to classify occupations, the 
2002 Census codes were added retroactively for all rounds and are also provided for the newer 
rounds of the survey along with 2010 COCs. Similarly, industries were described by their 3-digit 
1980 CIC in the NLSY79 until 2000; thereafter, 4-digit 2002 CICs are used. 2002 CICs are 
available for all rounds of the NLSY97. 
 In order to map all occupation codes across survey years, the 2002 Census Occupation 
Codes (COC) are first converted to 2000 COCs and then mapped to the 3-digit occupation codes 
(occ1990dd) constructed in Dorn (2009). Specifically, respondents’ 2000 COCs were mapped to 
occ1990dd using the crosswalks downloaded from http://www.ddorn.net/data.htm on September 
24, 2015. It emerged that there were 11 occupations which were not worked by NLSY97 
respondents, 21 occupations that could not be mapped to occ1990dd, and 2 occupations that were 
miscoded. After Dorn, we assigned the approximate 1990dd code to the 21 un-mapped 2000 COC 
occupations to minimize observation loss. The list of occupations that were manually mapped is 
as follows:  
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After mapping, the occupations are divided into 6 aggregate groups, using the do-files 
downloaded from the same Dorn website. The 6 groups, which are also used by Autor and Dorn 
(2013), are as follows: managerial and professional specialty; technical, sales, and administrative 
support; services; farming, forestry, and fishing; precision production, craft, and repair; and 
operators, fabricators, and laborers. There are 14 industry and sector groups. All public employees 
are assigned a single public administration/public sector dummy. The remaining 13 (private) 
industry/sector groups are agriculture, forestry, and fisheries; mining; construction; manufacturing 
(non-durable goods); manufacturing (durable goods); transportation, communications, and other 
public utilities; wholesale trade; retail trade; finance, insurance, and real estate; business and repair 
services; personal services; entertainment and recreation services; and professional and related 
services. 
2000 COC Occupation Name Occ1990dd Occupation Name 
123 Statisticians 68 Mathematicians and statisticians 
134 Biomedical engineers 59 Engineers and other professionals, n.e.c. 
383 Fish and game wardens 427 Protective service, n.e.c. 
416 
Food preparation and serving related workers, 
all other 
444 Miscellaneous food preparation and service workers 
631 Pile-driver operators 599 Misc. construction and related occupations 
521 Correspondence clerks 326 Correspondence and order clerks 
650 Reinforcing Iron and Rebar Workers 597 Structural metal workers 
705 
Electrical and Electronics Installers and 
Repairers, Transportation Equipment 
533 Repairers of electrical equipment, n.e.c. 
802 
Milling and Planning Machine Setters, 
Operators, and Tenders, Metal and Plastic 
703 Lathe, milling, and turning machine operatives 
812 
Multiple Machine Tool Setters, Operators, and 
Tenders, Metal and Plastic 
684 Other precision and craft workers 
884 Semiconductor Processors 779 Machine operators, n.e.c. 
911 
Ambulance Drivers and Attendants, Except 
Emergency Medical Technicians 
809 Taxi cab drivers and chauffeurs 
950 Conveyor Operators and Tenders 889 Laborers, freight, stock, and material handlers, n.e.c 
150 
Mining and Geological Engineers, Including 
Mining Safety Engineers 
59 Petroleum, mining, and geological engineers 
194 Nuclear Technicians 235 Other science technicians 
602 Animal breeders 479 Animal Breeders; Animal caretakers, except farm 
692 Roustabouts, oil and gas 616 Miners 
693 Helpers--extraction workers 617 Other mining occupations 
752 Commercial drivers 809 Taxi cab drivers and chauffeurs 
973 Shuttle car operators 808 Bus drivers 
974 Tank car, truck, and ship loaders 859 Stevedores and misc. material moving occupations 
467 Not in 2000 COC No Code N/A 
617 Not in 2000 COC No Code N/A 
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Appendix B: The Mapping of ASVAB and O*NET Components 
There are 10 ASVAB subtests (the 1997 version [CAT-ASVAB] has 12). Seven among these are 
grouped into three composites: Verbal, Math, and Science and Mechanical.20 We follow DoD 
guidelines in mapping ASVAB subtests to these composites and then to O*NET occupational 
knowledge, skill and ability components (KSAs). There are 110 KSAs – knowledge (sets of facts 
and principles needed to address problems and issues that are part of a job), skills (the ability to 
perform a task well), and abilities (enduring talent that can help a person do a job) – subsets of 
which are required to perform successfully in each occupation (O*NET 2010). For each of the 
occupations in the O*NET database, either expert job analysts, job supervisors, or job incumbents 
rate the degree of importance each of the KSAs and the degree of proficiency needed in each for 
satisfactory performance in that particular occupation (ASVAB Technical Chapter accessed at 
https://www.asvabprogram.com/pdf/ASVAB_CEP_Technical_Chapter.pdf). KSAs capture what 
workers in an occupation are expected to do, not what current workers in an occupation are doing 
or are capable of doing, although they are highly indicative of these average worker characteristics. 
In this way, KSAs are analogous to the item content of a test, as both perform the same function 
of operationalizing the domain in question. Therefore, linking ASVAB test content and scores with 
O*NET occupational requirements is a natural next step and is achieved through an analysis of the 
relationship between ASVAB subtests and the KSAs that best describe particular occupations. For 
this purpose, as a first stage, two experts identify 26 of the 110 KSAs from O*NET as possibly 
related to the ASVAB Verbal, Math, and Science and Mechanical/Technical Composites. Next, a 
larger group of expert judges (9 for verbal and math and 14 for STM), comprising 
industrial/organizational psychologists, other types of psychologists, and psychometricians, score 
                                                          
20 Shop Information, Auto Information, and Assembling Objects are not used for 1979 and in addition to these Coding 
Speed and Numerical Operations are not employed in 1997. 
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the relatability of each of these 26 individual KSAs and particular ASVAB subtest. A high 
correlation across judges’ scores is required to establish the links. The linkage shown below is 
drawn up in light of this factor analysis:  
ASVAB COMPONENT 
O*NET 
Knowledge/Skill/Ability 
O*NET COMPONENT 
Verbal      
Word Knowledge Ability  Inductive Reasoning 
Paragraph 
Comprehension 
Ability  Written Comprehension 
 Ability  Oral Comprehension  
 Knowledge English Language 
  Skill Reading Comprehension 
Math     
Arithmetic Reasoning Ability Deductive Reasoning 
Math Knowledge Ability Inductive Reasoning 
 Ability Written Comprehension 
 Ability Number Facility 
 Ability Mathematical Reasoning 
 Ability Information Ordering 
 Knowledge Mathematics 
 Skill Science 
  Skill Mathematics 
Science and Mechanical      
General Science Ability  Deductive Reasoning 
Mechanical 
Comprehension 
Ability  Inductive Reasoning 
Electronics Information Ability  Written Comprehension 
 Knowledge Mechanical  
 Knowledge Biology 
 Knowledge Computers and Electronics 
 Knowledge Engineering and Technology 
 Knowledge Chemistry 
 Knowledge Physics 
 Knowledge Building and Construction 
 Skill Technology Design 
 Skill Science 
 Skill Installation 
 Skill Troubleshooting 
 Skill Equipment Selection 
More information on knowledge, skill and abilities can be found at https://www.onet center.org/ 
dictionary/22.3/excel/. More information on ASVAB subtests can be found at https://www.bls.gov/nls/ 
nlsasv79.htm and a sample ASVAB score card can be found at https://www.nlsinfo.org/sites/nlsinfo.org/ 
files/attachments/170816/ASVAB Score Report Sample.pdf.   
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Appendix C: Instrumental Variables for Fertility Timing 
Siblings’ Average Age at the First Birth 
In the light of the possible endogeneity between occupational match quality and an individual’s 
fertility timing, Table 9 instruments individuals' relative/absolute ages at first birth using their 
siblings’ average age at the birth of their first child. The first stage results for IV-1 estimations are 
presented in Table C.1. As can be seen, individuals’ fertility time is strongly correlated with their 
siblings’ fertility time. A one-year increase in siblings’ average birth age will result in a 0.15 to 
0.2-year (about 2 to 2.5 months) increase in an individual’s absolute/relative age at first birth.  
The table also reports the tests of relevance and validity of the instrument. Test statistics 
indicate that the age at first birth variables are endogenous for females only, and our instrument is 
significantly and positively correlated with our endogenous variable.  
 
Alternative Instrumental Variable: Miscarriage at the First Pregnancy 
Our second instrument is an unconventional one. The literature on the wage penalty of 
motherhood instruments fertility timing in other ways for females. We will test the robustness of 
our results to choice of instrument using miscarriage at the first pregnancy to instrument the age 
at first birth after Miller (2011). As the NLSY79 data only contain information about a woman's 
Absolute 
Age
 Relative 
Age
Absolute 
Age
 Relative 
Age
Siblings' average age at first birth 0.2272 0.2264 0.1629 0.1497
[0.0401]**[0.0409]** [0.0437]**[0.0480]**
Control for demographic variables YES YES YES YES
Control for tenure and experience variables YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.31 0.28 0.33 0.31
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test (p-value) 0.51 0.58 0.03 0.03
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):   29.61 28.25 13.44 9.65
437.83 401.93 187.98 126.12
Notes: This table presents the first stage results and the relevant IV validity tests for the IV-1 estimations
in Table 9. The dependent variables are individuals' relative/absolute ages at first birth. ** denotes
significance at 0.01 level.
Table C.1. First Stage Regression for Siblings' Average Age at First Birth as Instrument
Male Female
Tests of endogeneity of birth-age or relative birth-age
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):  
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first pregnancy outcome, we conduct the estimations for females alone. In constructing an 
instrument for the age of first birth of women whose first pregnancy ended in an abortion, we use 
the timing of the first non-aborted pregnancy.21  The first stage regression results are presented in 
Table C.2. As shown in the table, the experience of a miscarriage at the first pregnancy leads to a 
2-year fertility delay. This instrument is both relevant and valid as indicated by the tests statistics 
reported below.  
     The second stage regression results using this alternative instrument are presented in Table C.3. 
Consistent with our results in the main body of the text a one-year delay in the fertility time 
significantly reduces the amount of mismatch by about 6 percent of a standard deviation.  
 
  
                                                          
21 Following Miller (2011), we used questions on pregnancy losses from multiple interview rounds of the NLSY79 – the first round 
asked about the first pregnancy and subsequent rounds about pregnancies since the last interview – to fill in if there was a 
miscarriage at the first non-aborted pregnancy for women whose first pregnancy ended in abortion.  
 
Measure of age at first birth IV-1 IV-2
-0.0632 -0.0639
[0.0157]** [0.0151]**
-0.0665 -0.0674
[0.0164]** [0.0159]**
Absolute age at the first birth
Notes:  The dependent variable is the rescaled total amount of mismatch. See notes to Table  
C.1 and Table 9. 
Table C.3. Second Stage Results for the Alternative Instrumental Variable: Miscarriage at 
the First Pregnancy 
Relative age at the first birth
Absolute 
Birth Age
 Relative 
Birth Age
Miscarriage at the first pregnancy 1.991 2.0933
[0.153]** [0.175]**
Control for demographic variables YES YES
Control for tenure and experience variables YES YES
R-squared 0.33 0.32
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):   150.02 129.847
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):  175.24 153.18
Table C.2.  First Stage Results for the Alternative Instrumental Variable: Miscarriage at the First 
Pregnancy 
Female
Note:  See notes of Table C.1.  
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Appendix D: The Numbers behind the Figures 
Flexibility and Mismatch 
 
Table D.1 is the basis of our Figure 2. The last column of the table indicates that working in flexible 
occupations leads to a greater amount of mismatch for females after the first birth. Notice that in 
the last column, the coefficient for More than 3 years before the first birth* Flexibility score is 
negative but statistically insignificant, suggesting that long before females’ first-birth working in 
flexible occupations does not yield greater mismatch. However, the effect becomes positive after 
the birth of the first child and in the case of More than 6 years after the first birth the flexibility 
interaction coefficient is positive and statistically significant. This means that mothers working in 
flexible occupations have much worse match quality compared with their childless counterparts 
more than 6 years following the birth of their first child – a one standard deviation increase in 
flexibility increases mismatch by about 8 percent of a standard deviation. This implies that mothers 
are trading off match quality for enhanced flexibility at work, an effect that becomes stronger as 
their children grow up. No such effects are observed for males. 
Male Female
Flexibility score -0.0365 -0.0236
[0.0233] [0.0244]
More than 3 years before the first birth 0.0444 0.030
[0.0322] [0.0425]
0-6 years after the first birth -0.0411 0.0918
[0.0258] [0.0389]*
More than 6 years after the first birth 0.0056 0.178
[0.0370] [0.0490]**
More than 3 years before the first birth* Flexibility score 0.0355 -0.0104
[0.0322] [0.0382]
0-6 years after the first birth*Flexibility score 0.0415 0.0282
[0.0283] [0.0351]
More than 6 years after the first birth*Flexibility score 0.0456 0.0766
[0.0320] [0.0336]*
Observations 23261 18761
Table D.1. Mismatch, Fertility Timeline, and Occupation Flexibility (NLSY79)
Notes : See notes to Table 10.
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Mismatch and the Gender Pay Gap  
Table D.2 is the basis of our Figure 3. This table outlines the gender gap in the wage loss from 
mismatch (relative to the mean wage) for individuals with different levels of early match quality. 
We selected individuals in the sample based on their early match quality (i.e. an individual’s match 
quality over the first 5 years of experience), distinguishing between the best and the worst 
occupational matches, respectively the top 10% and the bottom 10% in terms of match quality 
among both college graduates and non-graduates.  
 To illustrate the results given in this table, we provide the basis of the calculation for 
college graduates with 10 years of labor market experience. To simplify matters, we shall assume 
that total experience equals occupational tenure for everyone. Further, only the precisely estimated 
mismatch coefficients from the fourth column of Table 11 will be used. As there are no statistically 
significant gender differences in mismatch wage penalties, we base our calculation of mismatch 
and the gender wage gap on the following wage penalty coefficients: Current mismatch = -0.0311 
(viz. Mismatch*College and above); Cumulative Mismatch= -0.0934 (viz. Cumulative mismatch 
+ Cumulative mismatch*College and above). Current and past mismatch values are averages for 
these groups from data at the point of calculation. For example, for college graduates with the best 
early match quality, the average current mismatch is 1.29 for males and 2.14 for females at 10 
years of experience. The average cumulative mismatch is 1.53 for males and 1.87 for females at 
10 years of experience. Based on these values, we can compute the wage loss (relative to the mean 
wage) from each mismatch component. Thus, in the case of males, the wage effect of current 
mismatch is -0.04 (= -0.0311*1.29) and for cumulative mismatch it is -0.14 (= -0.0934*1.53). The 
corresponding wage losses for females are -0.07 (= -0.0311*2.14) and -0.17 (= -0.0934*1.87), 
respectively. The gender gap in wage loss associated with current mismatch – namely, the wage 
loss for females less the wage loss for males – is thus -0.032 (the ninth column of Table D.2) and 
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that associated with cumulative mismatch is also -0.026 (tenth column). The total gender gap in 
wage loss associated with mismatch is -0.058.  
         The penultimate column of Table D.2 presents a calculation of the gender gap in the wage 
loss from mismatch, using both the statistically insignificant and significant coefficients. We now 
base our calculations on the following wage penalty coefficients. Beginning with males: Current 
mismatch = -0.0262 (= 0.0049 + -0.0311) (viz. Mismatch + Mismatch*College and above); 
Cumulative Mismatch = -0.0934 (= -0.0421 + -0.0513) (viz. Cumulative mismatch + Cumulative 
mismatch*College and above); Current mismatch and occupational tenure interaction = 0.0005 (= 
-0.0009 + 0.0014) (viz. Mismatch*Occupation tenure + Mismatch*Occupation tenure*College 
and above). For females: Current mismatch = -0.0371 (= 0.0049 + 0.0063 + -0.0311 + -0.0172) 
(viz. Mismatch + Mismatch*Female + Mismatch*College and above + Mismatch* College and 
above*Female); Cumulative Mismatch = -0.0871 (= -0.0421 + -0.0052 + - 0.0513 + 0.0115) (viz. 
Cumulative mismatch + Cumulative mismatch*Female + Cumulative mismatch*College and 
above + Cumulative mismatch*College and above*Female); Current mismatch and occupational 
tenure interaction = -0.0016 (= -0.0009 + -0.0013 + 0.0014 + -0.0008) (viz. Mismatch*Occupation 
tenure + Mismatch*Occupation tenure*Female + Mismatch* Occupation tenure*College and 
above + Mismatch*Occupation tenure*College and above* Female). On this basis, the gender 
wage gap from current mismatch is equal to -0.045 (= -0.0371* 2.14 + 0.0262*1.29), from current 
mismatch and occupational tenure interaction it is equal to -0.0407 (= -0.0016*10*2.14 - 
0.0005*10*1.29), and from cumulative mismatch it is -0.0199 (= -0.0871 *1.87 + 0.0934*1.53). 
The total gender wage gap attributable to mismatch is therefore -0.106.  
 In similar fashion, we can calculate wage losses for college graduates with the worst early 
match quality. The total gender gap in wage loss associated with mismatch is 0.006 using only the 
precisely estimated coefficients, and -0.037 using both significant and insignificant ones.
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Cumulative 
mismatch
Current 
mismatch
Cumulative 
mismatch
Current 
mismatch
Cumulative 
mismatch
Current 
mismatch
Cumulative 
mismatch
Current 
mismatch
Cumulative 
mismatch
Current 
mismatch
Total (significant 
and  insignificant 
coefficients) 
Total (significant 
coefficients only) 
10 Year Exp.
Best 1.53 1.29 -0.14 -0.04 1.87 2.14 -0.17 -0.07 -0.032 -0.026 -0.106 -0.058
Worst 3.71 2.05 -0.35 -0.06 3.65 2.05 -0.34 -0.06 0.006 0.000 -0.037 0.006
20 Year Exp.
Best 1.8 1.31 -0.17 -0.04 2.36 2.01 -0.22 -0.06 -0.052 -0.022 -0.155 -0.074
Worst 3.41 1.94 -0.32 -0.06 3.57 1.83 -0.33 -0.06 -0.015 0.003 -0.087 -0.012
30 Year Exp.
Best 1.92 1.12 -0.18 -0.03 2.56 1.56 -0.24 -0.05 -0.060 -0.014 -0.164 -0.073
Worst 3.37 1.84 -0.31 -0.06 3.57 2.11 -0.33 -0.07 -0.019 -0.008 -0.155 -0.027
10 Year Exp.
Best 1.56 1.43 -0.07 0.01 1.6 1.59 -0.07 0.01 -0.002 0.000 -0.021 -0.002
Worst 3.96 2.53 -0.17 0.01 3.98 2.91 -0.17 0.01 -0.001 0.000 -0.043 -0.001
20 Year Exp.
Best 2.01 1.68 -0.08 0.01 2.07 1.76 -0.09 0.01 -0.003 0.000 -0.049 -0.003
Worst 4.08 2.38 -0.17 0.01 4.13 2.54 -0.17 0.01 -0.002 0.000 -0.076 -0.002
30 Year Exp.
Best 2.17 1.43 -0.09 0.01 2.23 1.56 -0.09 0.01 -0.003 0.000 -0.068 -0.003
Worst 4.11 2.32 -0.17 0.01 4.17 2.52 -0.18 0.01 -0.003 0.000 -0.111 -0.003
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Notes : Early match quality is the determined according to an individual's match quality over first 5 years of experience. In this table we have the top decile (Best) and the bottom decile (Worst) early career
matches. Current and past mismatch values are averages for these groups from data at the point of calculation. In the final column of the table we consider wage effects of mismatch using only the precisely
estimated mismatch coefficients; for example, excluding the coefficient of the interaction between mismatch and occupation tenure. The penultimate column computes wages effects using both precisely and
imprecisely estimated coefficient estimates. 
Female
Gender Gap 
Wage Effect Wage Effect
College Graduates 
Table D.2.  Mismatch and the Gender Wage Gap, by Experience, Early Match Quality, and Education
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Non-College Graduates
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Age
Birth 
Age=25
Birth 
Age=30 No Child
Birth 
Age=25
Birth 
Age=30 No Child
Birth 
Age=25
Birth 
Age=30 No Child
Birth 
Age=25
Birth 
Age=30 No Child
Birth 
Age=25
Birth 
Age=30
Birth 
Age=25
Birth 
Age=30
24 2.46 1.72 2.52 2.59 2.54 2.65 -0.23 -0.20 -0.24 -0.28 -0.25 -0.29 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04
25 2.16 1.70 2.01 2.64 2.58 2.68 -0.21 -0.19 -0.21 -0.27 -0.25 -0.27 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02
26 2.84 1.97 1.88 3.10 2.59 2.65 -0.25 -0.20 -0.20 -0.32 -0.26 -0.26 -0.06 0.00 -0.07 0.00
27 2.83 1.97 2.01 3.13 2.60 2.70 -0.25 -0.19 -0.20 -0.32 -0.25 -0.26 -0.05 0.01 -0.06 0.01
28 2.99 1.98 2.08 3.19 2.63 2.77 -0.25 -0.19 -0.20 -0.32 -0.25 -0.26 -0.05 0.01 -0.06 0.01
29 2.39 1.95 2.06 3.23 2.69 2.81 -0.23 -0.19 -0.20 -0.30 -0.25 -0.26 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.01
30 2.58 2.09 1.83 3.27 2.72 2.78 -0.22 -0.19 -0.18 -0.31 -0.25 -0.25 -0.04 0.00 -0.06 0.00
31 2.72 2.00 1.75 3.40 2.60 2.72 -0.23 -0.17 -0.17 -0.32 -0.24 -0.24 -0.05 0.00 -0.07 0.00
32 2.58 2.00 1.63 3.43 2.95 2.81 -0.22 -0.18 -0.17 -0.31 -0.26 -0.24 -0.05 -0.01 -0.07 -0.02
33 2.40 2.32 1.73 3.47 2.81 2.81 -0.21 -0.18 -0.17 -0.30 -0.26 -0.24 -0.04 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01
34 2.42 2.22 1.97 3.52 2.81 2.94 -0.21 -0.17 -0.17 -0.30 -0.25 -0.25 -0.03 0.00 -0.05 0.00
35 2.61 2.22 1.91 3.60 3.03 3.01 -0.20 -0.17 -0.17 -0.31 -0.26 -0.25 -0.04 0.00 -0.06 -0.01
24 1.99 1.92 2.10 2.06 2.40 2.24 -0.10 -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 -0.12 -0.11 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01
25 2.01 1.68 2.05 2.11 2.44 2.37 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 -0.10 -0.12 -0.12 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
26 2.39 1.87 2.00 2.52 2.50 2.42 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00
27 2.53 1.75 2.00 2.71 2.51 2.49 -0.14 -0.13 -0.13 -0.14 -0.13 -0.13 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00
28 2.14 1.81 2.02 2.71 2.65 2.58 -0.14 -0.13 -0.13 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00
29 2.14 1.84 2.02 2.72 2.69 2.61 -0.14 -0.14 -0.13 -0.15 -0.14 -0.14 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00
30 2.24 1.91 1.92 2.83 2.72 2.63 -0.14 -0.14 -0.13 -0.15 -0.15 -0.14 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00
31 2.14 1.88 1.97 2.87 2.73 2.66 -0.15 -0.14 -0.14 -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00
32 2.43 2.00 1.86 3.02 2.85 2.67 -0.15 -0.15 -0.14 -0.17 -0.16 -0.15 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
33 2.32 2.23 1.82 3.06 2.78 2.67 -0.16 -0.14 -0.14 -0.17 -0.16 -0.15 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
34 2.35 2.00 1.90 3.32 2.69 2.71 -0.17 -0.14 -0.14 -0.19 -0.16 -0.16 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.00
35 2.63 2.46 1.93 3.34 2.93 2.89 -0.17 -0.15 -0.15 -0.20 -0.18 -0.17 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.01
Wage Gap (Significant 
and insignificant)
Non-College Graduates
College Graduates
Table D.3. Motherhood Wage Penalty
Current Mismatch Cumulative Mismatch
Mismatch Wage Effect 
(Significant only)
Mismatch Wage Effect 
(Significant and insignificant)
Wage Gap (Significant 
coefficients only)
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Mismatch, Age at First Birth, and the Motherhood Wage Penalty  
Table D.3 is the basis of Figure 4. This table provides the differences in wage loss associated with 
mismatch for females who gave birth to their first child either at age 25 or age 30 vis-à-vis their 
childless counterparts.  
 To illustrate the results given in this table, we provide the basis of the calculation for 
college graduates entering the labor market at age 23. Again, we first consider the effects for 
precisely estimated mismatch coefficients shown in the final column of Table 11: Cumulative 
mismatch (-0.0509), Mismatch*College and above (-0.0429), and Mismatch*College and 
above*Occupation tenure (0.0029). Current and cumulative mismatch values are averages for 
these groups from data at the point of calculation. For example, at the age of 30 (or 5 years after 
the first birth for those who had a child at 25), the current mismatch is 1.83 for those without a 
child, 2.58 for those whose first birth age is 25, and 2.09 for those whose first birth age is 30; the 
cumulative mismatch is 2.78 for those without a child, 3.27 for mothers whose first birth age is 
25, and 2.72 for mothers whose first birth age is 30. Based on these values, we can compute the 
wage loss (relative to the mean wage) due to each mismatch component.  
           The wage effect of current mismatch is -0.0785 (= -0.0429*1.83) for those without a child, 
-0.111 (=-0.0429*2.58) for mothers whose first birth age is 25, and -0.090 (= -0.0429*2.09) for 
mothers whose first birth age is 30. The wage effect of cumulative mismatch is -0.142                           
(= -0.0509*2.78) for those without a child, -0.166 (=-0.0509*3.27) for mothers whose first birth 
age is 25, and -0.138 (= -0.0509*2.72) for mothers whose first birth age is 30. With respect to 
occupational tenure, by the age of 30 all groups will have 7 years of occupational tenure (here, for 
purposes of illustration we are imposing the restriction that they are employed in the same 
occupation). For its part, the wage effect from the interaction of current mismatch and occupational 
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tenure among college graduates is 0.037 (= 0.0029*1.83*7) for those without a child, 0.052 
(=0.0029*2.58*7) for mothers whose first birth age is 25, and 0.042 (= 0.0029*2.09*7) for mothers 
whose first birth age is 30. At the age of 30, the differences in wage loss associated with mismatch 
between mothers whose first birth age is 25 and their childless counterparts is -0.042 [=(-
0.0429*2.58+-0.0509*3.27+ 0.0029*2.58*7) - (-0.0429*1.83+-0.0509*2.78+ 0.0029*1.83*7)]. 
Similarly, the differences in wage loss associated with mismatch, between mothers to be whose 
first birth age is 30 and their childless counterparts at the at the same age is 0.002 [= ( -0.0429*2.09 
+ -0.0509*2.72 + 0.0029*2.09*7) - (-0.0429*1.83+-0.0509*2.78+ 0.0029*1.83*7)].  
 Figure 4 graphs these losses over the timeline of first birth (comparing the highlighted 
portions of the penultimate set of two columns). Comparing the two groups of mothers (with first 
birth age at 25 and 30) 5 years after the first birth will require us to compare their wage losses at 
ages 30 and 35, respectively. The gap for mothers who gave first birth at age 25, relative to their 
childless counterparts was earlier calculated to be -0.042. This gap is 0 for mothers who gave first 
birth at age 30 relative to their childless counterparts at age 35. This implies more than 4 percentage 
points higher wage loss due to mismatch for individuals with earlier births, 5 years after birth. 
Figure 4 captures only the gaps calculated using the precisely estimated coefficients. The last two 
columns of Table D.3 provide the corresponding gaps calculated using all relevant coefficients 
(significant and non-significant).    
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Appendix E: Marginal Effects for Table 12 
Comparison groups
Difference in 
Predicted 
Probabilities Std Err.
Non-college graduate NLSY79 female vs non-college graduate NLSY79 male -0.0138 0.0035 -0.0205 -0.007
College graduate NLSY79 male vs non-college graduate NLSY79 male -0.0183 0.0050 -0.0280 -0.0086
College graduate NLSY79 female vs non-college graduate NLSY79 male -0.0244 0.0054 -0.0351 -0.0137
Non-college graduate NLSY97 male vs non-college graduate NLSY79 male 0.0139 0.0044 0.0052 0.0226
Non-college graduate NLSY97 female vs non-college graduate NLSY79 male -0.0107 0.0047 -0.0200 -0.0015
College graduate NLSY97 male vs non-college graduate NLSY79 male 0.0171 0.0064 0.0046 0.0297
College graduate NLSY97 female vs non-college graduate NLSY79 male 0.0102 0.0061 -0.0018 0.0222
College graduate NLSY79 male vs non-college graduate NLSY79 female -0.0045 0.0054 -0.0151 0.0061
College graduate NLSY79 female vs non-college graduate NLSY79 female -0.0106 0.0058 -0.0221 0.0008
Non-college graduate NLSY97 male vs non-college graduate NLSY79 female 0.0277 0.0048 0.0183 0.037
Non-college graduate NLSY97 female vs non-college graduate NLSY79 female 0.0030 0.0050 -0.0068 0.0128
College graduate NLSY97 male vs non-college graduate NLSY79 female 0.0309 0.0068 0.0176 0.0442
College graduate NLSY97 female vs non-college graduate NLSY79 female 0.0239 0.0065 0.0112 0.0367
College graduate NLSY79 female vs college graduate NLSY79 male -0.0061 0.0059 -0.0176 0.0055
Non-college graduate NLSY97 male vs college graduate NLSY79 male 0.0322 0.0059 0.0206 0.0439
Non-college graduate NLSY97 female vs college graduate NLSY79 male 0.0076 0.0062 -0.0046 0.0197
College graduate NLSY97 male vs college graduate NLSY79 male 0.0354 0.0070 0.0218 0.0491
College graduate NLSY97 female vs college graduate NLSY79 male 0.0285 0.0067 0.0154 0.0416
Non-college graduate NLSY97 male vs college graduate NLSY79 female 0.0383 0.0060 0.0266 0.05
Non-college graduate NLSY97 female vs college graduate NLSY79 female 0.0136 0.0063 0.0013 0.0259
College graduate NLSY97 male vs college graduate NLSY79 female 0.0415 0.0071 0.0276 0.0554
College graduate NLSY97 female vs college graduate NLSY79 female 0.0346 0.0068 0.0213 0.0478
Non-college graduate NLSY97 female vs non-college graduate NLSY97 male -0.0247 0.0042 -0.0330 -0.0163
College graduate NLSY97 male vs non-college graduate NLSY97 male 0.0032 0.0060 -0.0086 0.015
College graduate NLSY97 female vs non-college graduate NLSY97 male -0.0037 0.0057 -0.0148 0.0073
College graduate NLSY97 male vs non-college graduate NLSY97 female 0.0279 0.0063 0.0155 0.0403
College graduate NLSY97 female vs non-college graduate NLSY97 female 0.0209 0.0060 0.0091 0.0327
College graduate NLSY97 female vs college graduate NLSY97 male -0.0070 0.0066 -0.0200 0.006
95% Confidence 
Interval
Table E1. Pairwise Comparisons of Predictive Margins
Notes: These differences in predicted probabilities are generated using Table 12 IV-Probit results. Stata 15 margins command is
used with pwcompare option calculated at specified values of education category, cohort and gender. Significant differences are
highlighted. 
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TABLES 
 
 
 
 
 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
0 Entire sample 6,403 6,283 166,478 163,358 4,599 4,385 73,584 70,160
1 In the cross-sectional sample/not oversampled 3,003 3,108 78,078 80,808 3,459 3,289 55,344 52,624
2 Not working before data sample period 2,394 2,703 62,244 70,278 3,276 3,172 52,416 50,752
3 Worked more than 1200 hours in the last 2 years 2,254 2,440 35,647 32,151 2,707 2,554 20,496 17,793
4 Not in the military for 2 years or more 2,253 2,440 33,828 30,161 2,707 2,554 20,492 17,793
5 Not in school 2,155 2,225 28,334 22,348 2,315 2,086 15,106 11,376
6 Currently working 2,154 2,223 28,262 22,295 2,313 2,085 15,067 11,367
7 Have valid occupation and industry information 2,146 2,217 26,645 21,144 2,288 2,045 13,356 10,099
8 Older than 16 years 2,146 2,217 26,645 21,144 2,288 2,045 13,356 10,098
9 Have valid ability measures 1,898 1,996 24,280 19,558 1,653 1,526 10,310 7,917
10 Have valid wage information 1,890 1,980 23,261 18,761 1,601 1,443 9,060 6,949
11 Have no missing information on variables of interest 1,890 1,980 23,261 18,761 1,588 1,434 8,981 6,912
Note: The values refer to annual data and are not derived from the monthly job arrays.
Table 1.  Sample Construction
NLSY79 (1979-2014) NLSY97 (1997-2013)
Criterion for sample selection
Remaining Remaining Remaining Remaining 
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Variable Definition All Male  Female All Male  Female
Female 0/1 Dummy (=1 if female) 0.45 0.43
Age at date of interview Age in years 33.8 33.5 34.2 25.1 25.0 25.3
Highest education = high school 0/1 Dummy 0.45 0.46 0.45 0.33 0.37 0.28
Highest education > high school 0/1 Dummy 0.19 0.17 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.22
Highest education ≥ 4-year college 0/1 Dummy 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.30 0.24 0.38
African-American 0/1 Dummy 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.14
Hispanic 0/1 Dummy 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.13 0.13 0.13
Have at least one child 0/1 Dummy 0.49 0.43 0.57 0.29 0.24 0.36
Have at least one child (age ≤ 33) 0/1 Dummy (NLSY79 age ≤ 33) 0.34 0.30 0.39
Age at the first birth Age in years 26.5 27.5 25.3 24.0 24.2 23.7
Age at the first  birth (age ≤ 33) Age in years (NLSY79 age ≤ 33) 24.9 25.6 24.0
Single 0/1 Dummy 0.28 0.31 0.25 0.67 0.70 0.63
Ever married (married, divorced, widowed, seperated) 0/1 Dummy 0.72 0.69 0.75 0.33 0.30 0.37
Age at the first marriage Age in years 24.8 25.7 23.7 24.7 25.0 24.4
Age at the first  marriage (age ≤ 33) Age in years (NLSY79 age ≤ 33) 23.5 24.3 22.6
Total labor market experience (mean) Mean years worked 14.3 14.4 14.2 8.75 8.67 8.85
Total labor market experience (median) Median years worked 13.0 13.0 12.0 9.00 9.00 9.00
Occupational tenure (mean) Mean years worked in the same occupation 6.36 6.35 6.37 3.52 3.50 3.54
Occupational tenure (median) Median years worked in the same occupation 4.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics of the Sample.
NLSY79 NLSY97
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# Individuals Math Verbal STM Social # Individuals Math Verbal STM Social
0.55 0.52 0.61 0.56 0.51 0.49 0.56 0.49
[0.30] [0.30] [0.30] [0.22] [0.29] [0.29] [0.30] [0.22]
0.50 0.53 0.42 0.55 0.52 0.52 0.46 0.56
[0.28] [0.29] [0.25] [0.23] [0.28] [0.28] [0.26] [0.22]
0.20 0.19 0.30 0.43 0.28 0.28 0.35 0.45
[0.16] [0.18] [0.26] [0.22] [0.22] [0.23] [0.27] [0.22]
0.21 0.20 0.18 0.36 0.25 0.28 0.24 0.48
[0.18] [0.20] [0.16] [0.18] [0.21] [0.22] [0.21] [0.23]
0.41 0.38 0.51 0.52 0.39 0.39 0.48 0.48
[0.25] [0.26] [0.29] [0.21] [0.25] [0.26] [0.28] [0.21]
0.36 0.42 0.33 0.50 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.54
[0.23] [0.25] [0.21] [0.22] [0.23] [0.23] [0.22] [0.21]
0.57 0.55 0.65 0.60 0.50 0.49 0.56 0.48
[0.26] [0.26] [0.26] [0.28] [0.26] [0.27] [0.29] [0.21]
0.49 0.54 0.41 0.55 0.50 0.53 0.46 0.56
[0.24] [0.26] [0.22] [0.22] [0.24] [0.25] [0.24] [0.21]
0.81 0.75 0.81 0.63 0.73 0.70 0.74 0.54
[0.19] [0.20] [0.19] [0.21] [0.22] [0.23] [0.23] [0.22]
0.73 0.74 0.58 0.64 0.68 0.68 0.59 0.60
[0.22] [0.22] [0.22] [0.22] [0.23] [0.23] [0.23] [0.21]
Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics of Worker Skill Endowments 
NLSY79 NLSY97
Whole Sample
Male 1890 1588
Female 1980 1434
Less than High School
Male 149 268
Female 109 187
High School
Male 780 455
Female 786 316
Some College
Male 358 354
Female 459 309
Notes: Average percentile ranks for each skill type are reported. Educational groups are defined by the highest degree ever completed. Standard errors
are given in brackets.
College and above
Male 603 511
Female 626 622
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[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Magnitude of 
over-
qualification 
Percent with 
endowment > 
requirement 
Share of over-
qualified
Magnitude of 
under-
qualification  
Percent with 
endowment < 
requirement 
Share of under-
qualified 
All Skills Male 0.200 - 50.7% 0.067 - 21.8%
Female 0.193 - 50.7% 0.071 - 22.5%
Math Male 0.192 66.3% 39.0% 0.062 34.1% 14.6%
Female 0.193 68.0% 40.1% 0.064 32.1% 14.0%
Verbal Male 0.197 33.2% 37.8% 0.056 66.8% 12.3%
Female 0.197 33.4% 40.8% 0.065 66.6% 12.3%
Social Male 0.231 74.4% 48.6% 0.048 25.6% 13.1%
Female 0.218 70.4% 45.1% 0.064 29.6% 16.3%
STM Male 0.180 40.9% 35.8% 0.103 59.1% 21.4%
Female 0.164 38.1% 34.5% 0.089 61.9% 18.0%
All Skills Male 0.172 - 44.4% 0.082 - 26.5%
Female 0.160 - 42.1% 0.093 - 29.5%
Math Male 0.170 64.8% 34.8% 0.073 35.2% 17.0%
Female 0.166 63.2% 34.6% 0.085 36.8% 19.5%
Verbal Male 0.164 39.0% 31.1% 0.077 61.0% 17.4%
Female 0.159 39.5% 32.8% 0.085 60.5% 20.5%
Social Male 0.170 61.0% 35.1% 0.084 39.0% 22.5%
Female 0.166 59.0% 34.5% 0.102 41.0% 25.7%
STM Male 0.183 37.7% 36.3% 0.092 62.3% 18.5%
Female 0.149 42.6% 31.5% 0.102 57.4% 21.0%
All Skills Male 0.181 - 48.8% 0.084 - 32.1%
Female 0.180 - 48.2% 0.078 - 27.2%
Math Male 0.167 60.5% 33.6% 0.078 39.5% 23.3%
Female 0.176 63.9% 36.6% 0.070 36.1% 20.5%
Verbal Male 0.195 35.0% 38.6% 0.063 65.0% 17.8%
Female 0.163 41.8% 31.8% 0.087 58.2% 24.4%
Social Male 0.198 69.6% 42.4% 0.062 30.4% 15.2%
Female 0.194 65.1% 40.7% 0.077 34.9% 20.2%
STM Male 0.164 45.8% 30.5% 0.133 54.2% 28.5%
Female 0.189 36.9% 37.6% 0.076 63.1% 17.2%
All Skills Male 0.181 - 47.7% 0.088 - 33.9%
Female 0.169 - 45.5% 0.091 - 33.4%
Math Male 0.178 63.4% 37.5% 0.073 36.6% 20.6%
Female 0.184 67.0% 38.9% 0.068 33.0% 19.1%
Verbal Male 0.187 37.2% 35.1% 0.073 62.8% 20.1%
Female 0.143 45.1% 28.0% 0.097 54.9% 27.0%
Social Male 0.162 59.7% 34.5% 0.100 40.3% 24.7%
Female 0.148 53.4% 31.8% 0.123 46.6% 31.0%
STM Male 0.195 38.4% 36.0% 0.104 61.6% 23.2%
Female 0.199 35.9% 40.8% 0.077 64.1% 17.7%
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Notes: "Magnitude of over-qualification" is the measure of the gap between the workers' endowments and
occupational requirements of their jobs when the the average skill endowment exceeds the average occupational
skill requirements. "Endowment > requirement" is a crude measure of over-qualification and the table reports the
percentage of workers with endowments that are greater than the skill levels required by their occupation. "Share of
over-qualified" refers to the share of workers who are more than one standard deviation more endowed than
required.  Measures of under-qualification are similarly constructed. 
Table 4. Extent and Size of Mismatch, by Experience, Skill Type, and Gender
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Full-Timers Part-Timers
Female -0.0253 -0.0712 -0.0309 -0.0325 -0.0310 -0.0402 -0.0017
[0.0256] [0.0299]* [0.0278] [0.0277] [0.0279] [0.0298] [0.0389]
Female* College Graduate 0.1588 0.1536 0.1509 0.1557 0.1515 -0.0709
[0.0569]** [0.0509]** [0.0508]** [0.0510]** [0.0532]** [0.1003]
College Graduate -0.1684 -0.2624 -0.2649 -0.2642 -0.2429 -0.1907
[0.0384]** [0.0388]** [0.0389]** [0.0388]** [0.0393]** [0.0889]*
Tenure and experience variables NO NO NO  YES  YES  YES  YES
Observations 42022 42022 42022 42022 42022 35893 6129
YES
Notes : The dependent variable is the rescaled total amount of mismatch. The additional variables in column (3) are race and average
measures of individual skills and occupational requirements. In addition, column (4) includes employer tenure, occupational tenure and
total experience, and their squared values, and also the interaction terms between skills and occupational tenure variables and between
occupational requirements and occupational tenure variables. Our baseline models will include all the controls in column 4.  In column (5) 
tenure and experience variables, and their interaction terms are instrumented. Clustered standard errors are given in brackets. **, *
denote significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
Table 5. The Determinants of Mismatch: The Role of Gender and Education (NLSY79)
OLS IV
Additional demographic and human capital 
controls and occupational requirements
NO NO YES YES YES YES
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All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female
Have at least one child -0.0307 -0.0129 0.076 -0.0189 -0.0156 0.1138 -0.0342 -0.0241 0.0965
[0.0292] [0.0294] [0.0350]* [0.0239] [0.0243] [0.0345]** [0.0247] [0.0252] [0.0355]**
0.0971 0.1305 0.1393
[0.0433]* [0.0392]** [0.0403]**
Female -0.0543
[0.0383]
Ever married -0.0273 -0.0047 -0.0125 0.0138 0.0162 -0.0455 0.0056 0.012 -0.0518
[0.0310] [0.0316] [0.0381] [0.0258] [0.0264] [0.0339] [0.0264] [0.0269] [0.0349]
Female * Ever married 0.034 -0.0576 -0.0492
[0.0477] [0.0398] [0.0408]
Observations 42022 23261 18761 42022 23261 18761 42022 23261 18761
Notes: The dependent variable is the rescaled total amount of mismatch. All specifications use the full set of controls as described in
column (4) of Table 5. In the IV specifications, the tenure and experience variables and their interaction terms are instrumented. The
standard errors in brackets are clustered at the individual level. **, * denote significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
 Table 6. The Determinants of Mismatch: The Role of Fertility and Marriage (NLSY79)
IV FE IV-FE
Female * Have at least one child
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Coefficient Odds Ratio Coefficient Odds Ratio
Have at least one child -0.0559 0.95 0.6675 1.95
[0.2403] [0.3574]+
Ever married -0.0403 0.96 0.5133 1.67
[0.2855] [0.3734]
Observations 15149 11125
Table 7.  The Probability of Being Over-qualified: The Role of Fertility and Marriage (NLSY79)
Male Female
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 when an individual's average total amount
of skill surplus exceeds the average of occupational requirements by 1 standard deviation.
Conditional fixed-effects logistic regression estimates are reported. All specifications contain the
full set of controls. Standard errors are given in brackets. +  denotes significance at the 0.1 level.    
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Male Female Male Female Male Female
More than 3 years before the first birth 0.0112 0.0474 0.0361 0.0261 0.0418 0.0349
[0.0403] [0.0444] [0.0313] [0.0387] [0.0319] [0.0393]
0-6 years after the first birth -0.0429 0.0567 -0.0375 0.0962 -0.0442 0.0829
[0.0324] [0.0393] [0.0252] [0.0339]** [0.0257]+ [0.0349]*
More than 6 years after the first birth -0.003 0.1043 0.015 0.1731 0.0022 0.1512
[0.0391] [0.0405]* [0.0358] [0.0459]** [0.0367] [0.0470]**
Observations 23261 18761 23261 18761 23261 18761
Notes: The dependent variable is the rescaled total amount of mismatch. The baseline group comprises individuals
who are within the 3 years period before the first birth. All specifications use the full set of controls. In the IV
specification, tenure and experience variables and their interaction terms are instrumented. Standard errors given in
brackets are clustered at the individual level. **, *, + denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively.    
Table 8.  Mismatch and the Fertility Timeline (NLSY79)
OLS FE IV-FE
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IV-1
Measure of age at first birth Male Female Female Male Female
0.0038 -0.004 -0.0398 0.0038 -0.0361
[0.0013]**[0.0015]** [0.0166]* [0.0032] [0.0160]*
0.0031 -0.0038 -0.0366 0.0028 -0.0332
[0.0013]* [0.0017]* [0.0151]* [0.0033] [0.0146]*
Notes: The dependent variable is the rescaled total amount of mismatch. Relative birth age
is calculated as "the year of the first birth - the year of labor market entry". All
specifications include the full set of controls. In IV-1, individuals' relative/absolute birth ages
are instrumented using their siblings' average age at the first birth. Only female estimates
are reported as endogeneity of birth age is not an issue in the case of males. In IV-2, tenure
and experience variables are also instrumented. Robust standard errors are given in
brackets. **, * denote significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively.    
Table 9.  Mismatch and Fertility Delay (NLSY79)
OLS IV-2                            
Relative age at the first birth
Absolute age at the first birth
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Male Female
Have at least one child -0.0199 0.1185
[0.0253] [0.0373]**
Have at least one child* Flexibility score 0.0409 0.0636
[0.0242]+ [0.0280]*
Flexibility score -0.0247 -0.0238
[0.0169] [0.0210]
Table 10.  Mismatch, Fertility, and Occupational Flexibility (NLSY79)
Notes : The dependent variable is the rescaled total amount of mismatch. All
models include full set of controls. Reported coefficients are from fixed effects
models where tenure and experience variables are instrumented. Models without
instrumentation proudce almost identical coefficient estimates. Standard errors
given in brackets are clustered at the individual level. **, *, + denote
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively.    
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IV
Male Female
Mismatch -0.0236 -0.0213 -0.0038 0.0049 0.0062 0.0038
[0.0062]** [0.0082]** [0.0080] [0.0090] [0.0105] [0.0095]
Mismatch*Occupation tenure -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0012
[0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0017] [0.0023] [0.0021]
Cumulative mismatch -0.0598 -0.0421 -0.0384 -0.0509
[0.0078]** [0.0094]** [0.0103]** [0.0081]**
Female -0.1429 -0.1416 -0.1449 -0.1257
[0.0196]** [0.0196]** [0.0269]** [0.0267]**
Female*Mismatch 0.0014 0.0056 0.0019 0.0063
[0.0080] [0.0089] [0.0088] [0.0102]
-0.0014 -0.0015 -0.0013
[0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0015]
Female*Cumulative mismatch 0.005 -0.0052
[0.0093] [0.0108]
Mismatch*College and above -0.0311 -0.0362 -0.0429
[0.0143]* [0.0152]* [0.0134]**
0.0014 -0.0004 0.0029
[0.0021] [0.0023] [0.0017]+
-0.0513 -0.0639 -0.0217
[0.0130]** [0.0156]** [0.0150]
Female*Mismatch*College and above -0.0172
[0.0181]
-0.0008
[0.0025]
0.0115
[0.0134]
Observations 42022 42022 42022 42022 23261 18761
Female*Cumulative mismatch*College and above
Notes: The dependent variable is the log real wage (measured in 2002 dollars). Estimates from IV models using the full set of
controls are reported. Tenure and experience variables are instrumented. The standard errors in brackets are clustered at the
individual level.  **, *, + denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively. 
Table 11.  Mismatch and Wage Outcomes (NLSY79)
All
Female*Mismatch*Occupation tenure
Mismatch*Occupation tenure*College and above
Cumulative mismatch*College and above
Female*Mismatch*Occupation tenure*College and above
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IVREG IVPROBIT
Female -0.0386 -0.1554
[0.0142]** [0.0402]**
Female*NLSY97 -0.0738 -0.1226
[0.0225]** [0.0630]+
Female*College graduate 0.102 0.0654
[0.0281]** [0.0795]
Female*College graduate*NLSY97 0.0328 0.1238
[0.0429] [0.1196]
College graduate*NLSY97 0.181 0.2489
[0.0304]** [0.0836]**
College graduate -0.2304 -0.2125
[0.0204]** [0.0577]**
NLSY97 0.1029 0.1952
[0.0181]** [0.0514]**
Observations 39112 39112
Table 12. The Determinants of Mismatch and Over-qualification: 
Cohort Differences (NLSY79 and NLSY97)
Notes: The dependent variables are the rescaled total amount of
mismatch and a dummy indicator for over-qualification as defined in
Table 7. NLSY97 is a dummy set equal to 1 if the observation is
from the NSLY97 cohort. Tenure and experience variables and their
interaction terms are instrumented. Robust standard errors are given
in brackets.**, + denote significance at the 0.01 and 0.1 levels,
respectively.    
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Male Female Male Female
Have at least one child -0.0261 0.0842
[0.0198] [0.0284]**
Have at least one child*NLSY97 0.0564 -0.0803
[0.0330]+ [0.0438]+
More than 3 years before the first birth 0.0379 0.0353
[0.0263] [0.0307]
0-6 years after the first birth -0.0195 0.0588
[0.0230] [0.0295]*
More than 6 years after the first birth 0.0667 0.1635
[0.0358]+ [0.0442]**
More than 3 years before the first birth*NLSY97 0.0007 0.0472
[0.0417] [0.0482]
0-6 years after the first birth*NLSY97 0.0519 -0.0276
[0.0379] [0.0463]
More than 6 years after the first birth*NLSY97 -0.0339 -0.0825
[0.0591] [0.0685]
Observations 22152 16960 22152 16960
Table 13. The Determinants of Mismatch: The Role of Family, Fertility Timeline, and Cohort 
Notes: The dependent variable is the rescaled total amount of mismatch. All specifications use
the full set of controls. Reported coefficients are from IV-Fixed Effects models where the
tenure and experience variables are instrumented. Standard errors given in brackets. **, *, +
denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively.    
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Female Male Female Male Female Male
Breadwinner*Have at least one child 0.0955 -0.0412 0.0512 -0.0738 0.0528 -0.0742
[0.0500]+ [0.0649] [0.0331] [0.0390]+ [0.0416] [0.0481]
Breadwinner -0.083 -0.1008 -0.0763 0.0145 -0.0766 0.0104
[0.0412]* [0.0474]* [0.0281]** [0.0306] [0.0347]* [0.0350]
Have at least one child 0.0229 0.03 0.0824 0.0517 0.0591 0.0464
[0.0467] [0.0645] [0.0315]** [0.0391] [0.0436] [0.0519]
Observations 14039 15998 14039 15998 14039 15998
NLSY97
Breadwinner*Have at least one child -0.0195 0.1543 0.0014 0.0184 0.0039 0.0157
[0.0935] [0.1231] [0.0614] [0.0754] [0.0763] [0.0848]
Breadwinner -0.0113 -0.074 -0.0878 -0.07 -0.0834 -0.0655
[0.0668] [0.0826] [0.0453]+ [0.0566] [0.0553] [0.0685]
Have at least one child 0.0279 -0.2038 0.0319 -0.0002 0.0373 0.0071
[0.0740] [0.1185]+ [0.0564] [0.0736] [0.0846] [0.0875]
Observations 2282 2384 2282 2384 2282 2384
Note: The dependent variable is the rescaled total amount of mismatch. All specifications use the full set of
controls with instrumentation for tenure and experience variables and their interactions. Only married
individuals who are living with a spouse are included in the sample. Breadwinner status is determined when
an individual's spouse does not have any wage income or the spousal wage income is less than that of the
respondent. Standard errors reported in brackets are clustered at the individual level. **, + denote
significance at the 0.01 and 0.1 levels, respectively.    
Table 14. Mismatch, Fertility, and Breadwinners (NLSY79 and NLSY97)
NLSY79
IV FE IV-FE
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A. Mismatch 
All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female
Have at least one child 0.0429 0.0418 0.0949 -0.0057 -0.0155 0.084 0.019 0.0222 0.1107 0.0074 0.011 0.0827
[0.0183]* [0.0190]* [0.0258]** [0.0280] [0.0181] [0.0245]** [0.0296] [0.0192] [0.0243]** [0.0261] [0.0168] [0.0249]**
-0.2347 -0.2228 -0.1379 -0.12 -0.1075 -0.1142 -0.1102 -0.1065 -0.0468 0.003 0.0126 -0.0652
[0.0315]** [0.0320]** [0.0407]** [0.0455]** [0.0305]** [0.0387]** [0.0506]* [0.0322]** [0.0383] [0.0513] [0.0283] [0.0394]+
0.0498 0.068  0.0894 0.0745
[0.0279]+ [0.0449] [0.0449]* [0.0471]
0.1063 0.0316 0.0621 -0.0494
[0.0492]* [0.0756] [0.0768] [0.0837]
College and above -0.131 -0.2215 -0.0159 -0.0792 -0.2367 0.1367 0.0321 0.0062 0.0683 0.0159 -0.2053 0.3146
[0.0689]+ [0.0912]* [0.1044] [0.1113] [0.0869]** [0.0993] [0.0925] [0.0918] [0.0982] [0.1062] [0.0806]* [0.1010]**
B. Over-qualified
All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female
Have at least one child 0.1992 0.2473 -0.2367 0.2912 0.2966 0.0339 0.165 0.1223 0.2694 -0.1728 -0.0979 0.329
[0.1673] [0.1946] [0.2108] [0.1774] [0.1908] [0.2175] [0.1177] [0.1185] [0.1964] [0.1314] [0.1352] [0.1908]+
-0.5384 -0.8614 0.5685 -0.3057 -0.3034 0.1596 -0.0842 -0.1537 0.0999 -0.2732 -0.0886 -1.0051
[0.2612]* [0.2945]** [0.3268]+ [0.2881] [0.2981] [0.3530] [0.1807] [0.1766] [0.3023] [0.2239] [0.2223] [0.3444]**
-0.3816 -0.2719 0.0112 0.6729
[0.2551] [0.2492] [0.1902] [0.1988]**
0.9308 0.4983 0.0592 -0.3224
[0.4244]* [0.4383] [0.3183] [0.3821]
College and above 1.0957 0.7753 0.8185 -0.953 -1.0511 -0.7854 0.0462 0.2553 -0.4793 0.5769 0.5895 0.6634
[0.6998] [1.1959] [0.8384] [0.7020] [0.9722] [1.0054] [0.4327] [0.5031] [0.8801] [0.6086] [0.7705] [0.9740]
Female* Have at least one child*College 
and above
Notes:  The dependent variables are the rescaled total amount of mismatch and a dummy indicator for over-qualification by each skill; for definition of overqualification see Table 7. All
specifications use the full set of controls. reported coeficients are from IV-Fixed Effects models where the tenure and experience variables are instrumented. Standard errors are given in
brackets. **, *, +  denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels, respectively.    
Table 15. The Determinants Mismatch and Over-qualification by Skill type (NLSY79)
Math Skills Verbal Skills STM Skills Social Skills
Female* Have at least one child*College 
and above
Math Skills Verbal Skills STM Skills Social Skills
Have at least one child* College and 
above
Female* Have at least one child
Have at least one child* College and 
above
Female* Have at least one child
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Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female
Math mismatch -0.0141 -0.0073 -0.0122 0.0009 -0.0153 -0.0076 -0.009 -0.0091
[0.0083]+ [0.0075] [0.0110] [0.0100] [0.0118] [0.0101] [0.0079] [0.0060]
Verbal mismatch -0.0078 -0.0048 0.0027 0.0031 0.0152 0.0136 -0.0015 0.0061
[0.0077] [0.0075] [0.0104] [0.0095] [0.0117] [0.0098] [0.0081] [0.0069]
STM mismatch -0.0028 -0.0055 -0.0098 -0.0243 -0.0043 -0.0207 -0.0087 -0.0063
[0.0070] [0.0076] [0.0086] [0.0097]* [0.0085] [0.0090]* [0.0063] [0.0065]
Social-noncognitive mismatch 0.0054 0.0037 0.0013 0.0006 -0.0027 -0.0049 -0.0053 -0.0009
[0.0065] [0.0060] [0.0082] [0.0076] [0.0091] [0.0078] [0.0072] [0.0059]
Math mismatch*Occupation tenure -0.0007 -0.0025 -0.0006 -0.0024 -0.001 -0.0015
[0.0026] [0.0018] [0.0026] [0.0018] [0.0019] [0.0011]
Verbal mismatch*Occupation tenure -0.0036 -0.0026 -0.0034 -0.0026 -0.0037 -0.0032
[0.0027] [0.0020] [0.0026] [0.0020] [0.0020]+ [0.0014]*
STM mismatch*Occupation tenure 0.0023 0.0057 0.0024 0.0058 0.0018 0.0018
[0.0017] [0.0018]** [0.0017] [0.0018]** [0.0013] [0.0014]
Social-noncognitive mismatch*Occupation tenure 0.0012 0.0007 0.0011 0.0008 0.0003 -0.0001
[0.0019] [0.0014] [0.0019] [0.0014] [0.0016] [0.0011]
Cumulative math mismatch 0.0041 0.0185 -0.0464 -0.0224
[0.0123] [0.0109]+ [0.0139]** [0.0132]+
Cumulative verbal mismatch -0.0241 -0.0239 -0.0438 -0.0228
[0.0118]* [0.0102]* [0.0152]** [0.0129]+
Cumulative STM mismatch -0.0135 -0.0081 0.0081 0.000
[0.0084] [0.0095] [0.0094] [0.0113]
Cumulative social-noncognitive mismatch 0.0085 0.0114 -0.0095 -0.0215
[0.0089] [0.0080] [0.0104] [0.0102]*
Observations 23261 18761 23261 18761 23261 18761 23261 18761
Table 16. Mismatch and Wages by Skill Type (NLSY79)
IV IV-FE
Notes: The dependent variable is the log real wage (measured in 2002 dollars). Only coefficient estimates for the mismatch variables are
reported. All specifications use the full set of controls. Reported coefficients are from IV and IV-Fixed Effects models where the tenure and 
experience variables are instrumented. Robust standard errors are given  in brackets. **, *, + denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1
levels, respectively.    
